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RATE REGULATION AS AFFECTED BY THE DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS
IN THE CONSTITUTIONS.*
INTRODUCTORY.

In this article an effort will be made to show that, within
their respective jurisdictions and within constitutional
bounds, both Congress and the state legislatures may limit
the charges for railroad transportation, either specifically
or by definite general rules; and that if the legislative department of government establishes such rules it may empower a commission to name specific rates in accordance
therewith; but that, on the other hand, such rules may be
established only by the legislative department, and until
they are so established no commission may constitutionally
ordain specific rates. We shall, furthermore, consider the
question whether the statutes which empower commissions
to name specific rates do establish definite principles of
which the commissions are simply called upon to state the
specific applications or whether by those statutes the at* Copyright, i9o8, by Robert P. Reeder.
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tempt is made to entrust to the commissions a discretion
which is so broad as to be unconstitutional.
As the rules of constitutional law which are involved
have been frequently misunderstood even by the courts
which have endeavored to apply them, it will be necessary
to examine at some length those rules and the more important cases which have arisen under them.
GENERAL RULE AS TO DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS.

The United States and the several states have by their
respective constitutions made partial' distributions of the
powers of those governments among three departments of
government. In so doing they have by implication, and
at times by express words, declared that an organ possessing the characteristics of one department shall not exercise powers which have been entrusted only to another department. 2 It is this restraint which we shall consider in
the present article.
Obviously, the distributive clauses of the federal Consti' See page 4,

infra.

'Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., 126; Cooley, Constitutional Law, 3d ed., 46; Black, Constitutional Law, 2d ed., pp. 78-84;

Bondy, The Separation of Governmental Powers, (Columbia University
Studies) i9-22; 6 A. & E. Enc. of L., 2d ed., ioo6, lOO9; 8 Cyc. 8o7,
828, 844, 858; State v. Johnson, (1goo) 61 Kan. 8o3, 6o Pac. io68, 49 L.
R. A. 662; Western U. T. Co. v. Myatt, (i8g9) 98 Fed. 335; Shephard
v. City of Wheeling, (1887)' 3o W. Va. 479, 4 S. . 635. Compare 6
A. & E. Enc. of L., 2d ed., 1007; State v. Bates, (9o5) 96 Minn. nio,
116, 104 N. W. 709,

712;

Sawyer v. Dooley, (1893)

21 Nev. 390,

32

Pac.

437; and authorities cited in note 6, infra; and see Atlantic E. Co. v.
Wilmington & W. R. Co., (1892) 1In N. C. 463, 16 S. E. 393, 18 L. R.
A. 393. Professor Dunning, in ig Pol. Sci. Quar. 487, claims that
Aristotle did not express the views concerning the distribution of governmental powers which later writers have attributed to him.-The
statement in the text is obviously true as to those constitutions which
contain express declarations to that effect. As to those which do not
contain such declarations, it is clear that one department cannot exercise
power which has been entrusted only to another department without
the consent of the latter. And the question whether even the consent
ol the latter can validate the exercise of a power otherwise than as
provided in the constitution must be answered by a consideration of
the purpose of those who adopted the constitutions when they decided
to grant different governmental powers to different organs of government.
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tution relate only to the federal government,3 and the distributive clauses of the state constitutions relate only to the
governments of the respective states. Yet whether we consider the power of an organ of the federal government or
the power of an organ of a state government, the problems
involved will be the same, for there is a general uniformity
among the constitutions, although, of course, there are also
variations among the constitutions which may prevent uniform answers to those problems, and even under similar
be reached by the auprovisions different conclusions may
4
jurisdictions.
different
of
thorities
It is true that the actual distribution of powers is not
strictly logical; that, for instance, the president or governor
exercises power which is legislative in its character when
he vetoes legislation, and legislative bodies exercise power
of a judicial nature when they try cases of impeachment
and power of an administrative nature when they consider
appointments to office. 5 But such constitutional exceptions,
3
The United States Supreme Court said in Satterlee v. Matthewson,
(1829) 2 Pet. 380, 413, "There is nothing in the Constitution of the

United States which forbids the legislature of a state to exercise
judicial functions!' See also Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3 Dall. 386; Randall v. Kreiger, (1874) 23 Wall. 137, 147; Consolidated R. Co. v.
State, (p9o8) 207 U. S. 541, 552, 28 Sup. Ct. 178, 181; Michigan C. R.
Co. v. Powers, (i9o6) 2oi U. S. 245, 294, 26 Sup. Ct. 459, 462, 463;
League v. Texas, (19o2) 184 U. S. 156, I61, 22 Sup. Ct. 475, 477;
Winchester & S. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, (i9o6) io6 Va. 264, 267, 269,
55 S. E. 692, 693, 694; Bondy, The Separation of Governmental Powers,
(Columbia University Studies) 21; Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. State,
(igo8) 210 U. S. 187, 202, 28 Sup. Ct. 650, 655; Claiborne Co. v. Brooks,
(1884) 1II U. S. 400, 410, 4 Sup. Ct. 489, 494. The dates of the cases
will be noted, however.
'Trustees v. Saratoga G., E. L. & P. Co., (19o8) 19i N. Y. 123, 83
147 Mich. 127, 131, 132, 110
N. E. 693, 696; People v. Cook, (197o)
N. W. 514, 516; State v. Kline, (1907) Ore., 93 Pac. 237, 239; Winchester & S. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, (19o6) io6 Va. 264, 55 S. E.
692; Wheeler's Appeal, (1877) 45 Conn. 3o6; McGehee, Due Process of
Law, 71; Goodnow, The Principles of the Administrative Law of the
United States, 33, 95; and see remarks of Christiancy, J., in People v.
Hurlburt, (1874) 24 Mich. 44, 63.
"On the power of a legislature to appoint its own subordinate officers
and to conduct investigations-which are not acts of a legislative nature,
and on the power of a court to appoint its own subordinate officers and
to exercise analogous powers-which are not acts of a judicial nature,
see the discussion in Board of Comrs. v. Gwin, (1894) 136 Ind. 562,
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and even exceptions, which appear in some constitutions,
which directly affect rate regulation, do not lessen the positiveness of the rule in unexcepted cases.
It is, however, important that we notice that the distribution of powers is not complete, so that while some powers
may be exercised only by the legislature, others only by an
administrative organ, and still others only by the courts,
there are also powers which are not definitely assigned by
the constitutions and which may, therefore, be exercised by
the legislature itself or be assigned by it to one of the other
departments. 6 Moreover, the legislature may grant some
self-government to the localities. 7 In so doing it is not
36 N. E. 237; Goodnow, The Principles of the Administrative Law of
the United States, 37, 41, 446-448; Bondy, The Separation of Governmental Powers, (Columbia University Studies) 34, 70, 76, 84, 114, r15,
122, 138; Black, Constitutional Law, 2d ed., p. 76; In re Janitor of

Supreme Court, (1874) 35 Wis. 410; In re Chapman, (897) 166 U. S.
661, 17 Sup. Ct. 677; State v. Pierre, (io8) 121 La., 46 So. 574. And
see 6 A. & E. Enc. of L., 2d ed., 1007; 21 Harv. L. Rev. 161. Compare
the authorities cited in note 22, infra. The actual decision in Kilbourn
v. Thompson, (i88o) 1o3 U. S. 168, was simply that the federal House
of Representatives did not have authority to make the particular investigation there considered.
'See Cooley, Constitutional Law, 3d ed., 45, 46; Bondy, The Separation of Governmental Powers, (Columbia University Studies) 79, 8o;
Stevens, Sources of the Constitution of the United States, 49; Toncray
v. Budge, (19o8) Idaho, 95 Pac. 26; Incorporated Village of Fairview v.
Giffee, (9o5) 73 Ohio St. 183, 76 N. E. 865; State v. Struble, (9o5) 19
S. D. 646, 104 N. W. 465; State v. Bates, (19o5) 96 Minn. 11o, 1o4
N. W. 7o9; Paul v. Glouceste" County, (1888) 5o N. J. L. 585, 61r, i5
Atl. 272, 284; Brown v. Turner, (1874) 7o N. C. 93, xo2; 6 A. & E. Enc.
of L., 2d ed., 1007; Ross v. Whitman, (1856) 6 Cal. 361; Opinion of

Justices, (885) 138 Mass. 6oi; page xo, infra, and note 66, infra. And
there are powers which other organs may exercise until forbidden by
the legislature: see, c. g., 8 A. & E. Enc. of L., 2d ed., 29, 30; compare
note 22, infra.
'Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., 165, 172, 263, 264; 8 Cyc.
837; 6 A. & E. Enc. of L., 2d ed., 1027, 1024; 28 id. i6o; Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 4th ed., sec. 3o8; Goodnow, The Principles of the
Administrative Law of the United States, 37; and see Oberholtzer, The
Referendum in America, 324, 332, 334; Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 2d ed., p. 170. Compare Elliott v. City of Detroit, (i89g) 121

Mich. 611, 84 N. V. 820; In re Municipal Suffrage to Women, (1894)
i6o Mass. 586, 36 N. F-488, 23 L. R. A. 113; Bradshaw v. Lankford,
(i89i) 73 Md. 428, 21 Atl. 66, I L. R A. 582; Slinger v. Henneman,
(1875) 38 Wis. 504; Burton v. Dupree, (1898) i9 Tex. Civ. App. 275,
46 S. W. 272. Congress may grant local, but only local, powers to the
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reassigning power which has been entrusted exclusively to
itself, for such limited power has been constantly granted to
local authorities from time immemorial, and the general
language of the constitutions is interpreted in accordance
with this custom, since contemporary history does not furnish any reason for thinking that those who adopted the
constitutions intended to abolish the custom. And, of
course, the fact that a constitution assigns a given power
to one organ of the central government does not of itself
oblige the legislature when it bestows a similar power over
strictly local matters upon an organ of local government to
bestow it upon a similar organs
territories: see Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, (1899) 129 U. S. 141, 9 Sup.
Ct. 256; and also McCornicek v. Western U. T. Co., (1897) 79 Fed.
449, 451; Ansley v. Ainsworth, (19o2) 4 Ind. Ter. 3o8, 69 S. W. 884.
It seems that there would be less "refinement of reasoning" (see In re
Rahrer, (89i) 140 U. S. 545, 562, i1 Sup. Ct. 865, 869) in sustaining
local option and similar laws upon the ground given in the text than
in sustaining them upon the ground which is usually given: Paul v.
Gloucester County, (1888) 5o N. J. L. 585, 594, 6oo, 6o3, 6o4, 15 Atd.
272, 276, 279, 28o; and see Oberholtzer, The Referendum in America,
208-217, 324; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., I68, i69.
Compare Field v. Clark, (1892) 143 U. S. 649, 694, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 5o5;
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 2d ed., p. 173; Oberholtzer, op. cit.,
324, 328; Evers v. Hudson, (1907) Mont., 92 Pac. 462, 466, 467; Pouts v.
Hood River, (9o5)
46 Ore. 492, 81 Pac. 370, i L. R. A. N. S. 483;
McGonnell's License, (i9o4) 209 Pa. 327, 58 Atl. 615; Locke's Appeal,
(1873) 72 Pa. St. 491, 5o8. On the other hand, it is submitted that delegations of power to state boards cannot properly be based upon this
exception to the general rule, however defensible they may sometimes
be upon another ground. Consider Brodbine v. Revere, (19o3) 182
Mass. 598, 66 N. E. 607; People v. Harper, (1878) 91 Ill. 357, 370;
Pierce v. Doolittle, (19o6) 130 Iowa, 333, 336, io6 N. W. 751, 752, 6
L R. A. N. S. 143, 145; Tilley v. Savannah, F. & W. R. Co., (i88i)
5 Fed. 641, 657; ig Harv. L. Rev. 2o3; 2o Harv. L. Rev. 147.
'People v. Provines, (1868) 34 Cal. 520, 532; Eckerson v. City of
Des Moines, (Igo8) Iowa, XI5 N. W. 177, 182; Staude v. Board of
Election Corers., (1882) 6r Cal. 313, 322; see also Commonwealth v.
Collier, (195o)
213 Pa. 138, 62 Atd. 567; Muhlenberg Co. v. Morehead,
(18g8) 20 Ky. L. Rep. 376, 46 S. W. 484; Pennington v. Woolfolk,
(i88o) 79 Ky. 13; Terre Haute v. Evansville & T. H. R. Co., (1897) 149
Ind. 174, 46 N. E. 77, 37 L. R. A. 189; Fox v. McDonald, (1893) zo1
Ala. 5r, 69, r3 So. 416, 419; Bondy, The Separation of Governmental
Powers, (Columbia University Studies) 179, 183; Goodnow, The Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States, 35-37; and cases
there cited. Compare State v. Armstrong, (1907) Miss., 44 So. 8o9;
Mayor v. Dechert, (187o) 32 Md. 369; and also Trustees v. Saratoga

G., E. L. & P. Co., (i9o8) 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693, 696.
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EXTENT OF POWER OF LEGISLATURE.

At the time of the American Revolution the British Parliament had absolute power over the persons and political
institutions under British control, subject only to a veto
power.9 By the Revolution the state legislatures acquired
similar power over the persons and political institutions of
their states, subject to gubernatorial veto, although constitutions soon limited their powers and placed some powers
in the hands of other governmental organs beyond the
reach of legislative exercise or control. 10 And while Congress can deal only with subject-matters entrusted to it,"
'See Blackstone, Commentaries, I, *91, *I6o-'*62; Lee v. Bude &
T. J. Ry. Co., (871) L. R. 6 C. P. 576, 582; Courtney, The Working
Constitution of the United Kingdom, 4; Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 6th ed., 58 et seq.; Hurtado v. People, (1884) 110 U. S. 516, 531,
4 Sup. Ct. III, 292, ii9; Slaughter House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. 36, 65.
That veto power has not been exercised since 1707: Anson, The Law
and Custom of the Constitution, 3d ed., I, 301.
"'"The legislative power is the supreme authority except as limited
by the constitution of the state, and the sovereignty of the people is
exercised through their representatives in the legislature unless by the
fundamental law power is elsewhere reposed :" McPherson v. Blacker,
(1892) 146 U. S. I, 25, 13 Sup. Ct. 3, 7. See also Northwestern N. L.
L Co. v. Riggs, (19o6) 203 U. S. 243, 253, 27 Sup. Ct. 126, 128; Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 2d ed., sec. 81; Patterson, The United
States and the States Under the Constitution, 2d ed., p. 2; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., 128, 233, 236, 241; 6 A. & E. Enc. of
L., 2d ed., 934; 8 Cyc. 775; Black, Constitutional Law, 2d ed., pp. 63, 64;
Sedgwick, Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law, 2d ed.,
154; Goodnow, The Principles of the Administrative Law of the United
States, 40; 7 Harv. L. Rev. 422; 32 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 1o93, 1097;

Dorman v. State, (1859) 34 Ala. 216; Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co.,
(1854) 27 Vt. 14o; Redell v. Moores, (igoi) 63 Neb. 219, 230, 231, 88

N. W. 243, 247, 55 L. R. A. 74o, 744, 745; State v. Missouri P. Ry. Co.,
(19o7) Kan., 92 Pac. 6o6, 613; Ratcliff v. Wichita U. S. Co., (19o6) 74
Kan. i, 16, 86 Pac. 15o, 155; State v. Fountain, (19o8) Del., 69 At. 926,
93o; Harder'sF. S. & V. Co. v. Chicago, (19o8) Ill., 85 N. E. 245, 247;

dissenting opinion in Abbott v. Beddingfleld, (1899)

125 N. C. 256, 268,

272, 34 S. E. 412, 415, 416; 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383; Century and American

Digests, Const. Law, II, B, Grant or limitation of power. On the
effect of a grant of power to legislate see note 13, infra. With authorities in this note compare State v. Moores, (1898) 55 Neb. 480, 490, 76
N. W. 175, 177, 41 L. R. A. 624, 627, and authorities there cited (which

case was overruled in Redell v. Moores, supra); 32 Am. L. Reg. N. S.
3, 784, 971, 1064; 13 Harv. L. Rev. 44ti; Report of Pennsylvania Bar
Assn., V1, 251.

'Hodges v. United States, (z9o6) 203 U. S. 1, 16, 27 Sup. Ct. 6, 8;

OF POWERS IN THE CONSTITUTIONS

except in regard to the territories, 12 as to such subjectmatters its general power is the same as that of state legislatures over subject-matters not removed from their control, 13 though it also is under express restrictions and some
governmental powers have been placed beyond its exercise
or control. In other words, the state legislatures, over subject-matters not withdrawn from their control, and Congress, over subject-matters entrusted to it, have all governmental powers not entrusted by the constitutions to other
organs of government and not withdrawh from the control of those legislative bodies by other provisions of the
constitutions.
It is, therefore, clear that legislative bodies may determine
the principles upon which railroad charges shall be based
and may themselves ordain specific schedules of rates for
future transportation, unless those powers, or either of
them, have been entrusted exclusively to another organ of
government by the constitutional provisions which assign
judicial powers to the courts or by those which assign administrative powers to administrative organs, or unless the
legislatures are restrained by other constitutional provisions
which we need not here consider.
The question whether a legislature in making enactments
of the character referred to would entrench upon the power

United States v. Harris,(883) io6 U. S. 629, 635, I Sup. Ct. 6oi, 6o6;
Kansas v. Colorado, (907) 2o6 U. S. 46, 8I, 87, 88, 8, 92, 27 Sup. Ct.

655, 661, 663, 664, 665.
"National Bank v. County of Yankton, (1879)

101 U. S. 129;
Utter v. Franklin, (1899) 172 U. S. 416, 423, 19 Sup. Ct 183, 186;
Mormon Church v. United States, (i89o) 136 U. S. I, 42, 43, 10 Sup.
Ct. 792, 8o2, 8o3. See also De Lima v. Bidwell, (igoi) 182 U. S. i,
196, 21 Sup. Ct. 743, 753; Shively v. Bowlby, (1894) 152 U. S. 1, 48, r4
Sup. Ct 548, 566; Patterson, The United States and the States Under
the Constitution, 2d ed., pp. 8, 9.
"See Patterson, The United States and the States Under the Constitution, 2d ed., p. 17; luilliard v. Greenman, (1884) ixo U. S. 42r,
447-450, 4 Sup. Ct. 122, 129-131; Burton v. United States, (x9o6) 202
U. S. 344, 366, 367, 26 Sup. Ct 688, 693; Chinese Exclusion Case, (1889)
130 U. S. 581, 6o3, 6o4, 9 Sup. Ct. 623, 629; Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824)
9 Wheat I, 196, 197; McMurtrie, Observations on Mr. George Bancrofes Plea for the Constitution, 24, 25.

66

RATE REGULATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION

of an administrative organ has apparently never arisen,
and it is doubtful whether such a contention will ever be
made. We must, however, consider the question whether
legislative enactments of that character would entrench
upon the power of the courts.
It is true that, in the absence of statute, the courts may,
in cases properly before them, determine the amount which
a common carrier may charge for services rendered by it.14
But there is a clear distinction between applying an existing rule of law (in that case the common law) and adopting a new and possibly different rule of law for relations
which may exist in the future. 15 The legislature, in regulating rates, is not deciding what the rights of parties are
at the time the schedule is enacted. It is not interpreting
the common law. It is adopting for the future a rule which
supersedes that law.
And certainly the legislature may change the common
law. 16 The only legal restrictions upon legislative action
'Stern v. Metropolitan T. & T. Co., (1897) 46 N. Y. Supp. nlo,
19 N. Y. App. Div. 316; Cook & Wheeler v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.
Co., (i8go) 8z Iowa, 551, 46 N. W. io8o, 9 L. R. A. 764; Menacho v.
Ward, (1886) 27 Fed. 529. Even without such decisions, it would seem
to follow from the fact that a common carrier cannot refuse to carry:
Jackson v. Rogers, (1683) 2 Show. 327, that the carrier cannot escape
this duty by charging whatever it pleases.
"It is one thing to inquire whether the rates which have been
charged and collected are reasonable-that is a judicial act; but an
entirely different thing to prescribe rates which shall be charged in the
future-that is a legislative act :" Interstate Com. Comn. v. Cincinnati,
N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., (1897) 167 U. S. 479, 499, 17 Sup. Ct. 896, 9o0.
See also 167 U. S.505, 17 Sup. Ct. 902; McChord v. Louisville & N. R.
Co., (1902) 183 U. S.483, 495, 22 Sup. Ct.,i65, i69; State v. Johnson,
(igoo) 61 Kan. 803, 6o Pac. io68, 49 L. R. A. 662; Western U. T. Co.
v. Myatt, (1899) 98 Fed. 335; Shephard v. City of Wheeling, (1887) 30
W. Va. 479, 4"S. E. 635. Cases sustaining, legislative regulation are
cited in Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. North C. Corp. Comn., (1907) 2o6 U. S.
1,19, 27 Sup. Ct. 585, 591.
" See Munn v. Illinois, (1876) 94 U. S. Ti3, 134; West v. Louisiana,

(19o4) 194 U. S. 258, 262, 24 Sup. Ct. 65o, 652; Dilworth v. Schuylkill
L L. Co., (1908) 219 Pa. 527, 530, 69 AtI. 47, 48; Sutherland v. Governor, (1874) 29 Mich. 320, 325, 326; Blackstone, Commentaries, I, *89;
6 A. & E. Enc. of L., 2d ed., 1O34, IO35; and notes 9 and IO,supra. In

Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., (1894) 154 U. S.362, 397.14 Sup. Ct
1047, Io54, the court, after saying correctly, "It is doubtless true, as a
general proposition, that the formation of a tariff of charges for the
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are those imposed by the constitutions. If a principle of
the common law has been inserted in the constitutions it is
binding upon the legislatures not as a principle of the common law but as a provision of the constitutions. And the
fact that courts enforce compliance with some constitutional
provisions certainly does not show that rate regulation is
judicial in its nature. 17
Nor do the constitutional provisions now under consideration oblige the legislature to state merely general principles and leave to the courts the statement of the application of those principles to particular circumstances which
may exist thereafter. The legislature may do so, unquestransportation by a common carrier of persons or property is a legislative or administrative rather than a judicial function," goes on to say,
"Yet it has always been recognized that, if a carrier attempted to charge
a shipper an unreasonable sum, the courts had jurisdiction to inquire
into that matter and to award to the shipper any amount exacted from
him in excess of a reasonable rate; and also in a reverse case to render
judgment in favor of the carrier for the amount found to be a reasonable charge. The province of the courts is not changed, nor the limits
of judicial inquiry altered, because the legislature instead of the carrier
prescribes the rates." This reference to the common law as furnishing
a ground for judicial inquiry into the propriety of rates named by a
governmental authority is clearly inappropriate. And the reason given
for the decision in Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, (i8go)
134 U. S. 418, io Sup. Ct. 462, 702, is likewise unsound. See Noyes,
American Railroad Rates, 250; Steenerson v. Great N. Ry. Co., (1897)
69 Minn. 353, 375, 72 N. W. 713, 716; San Diego L & T. Co. V.
National City, (1899) 174 U. S. 739, 754, 19 Sup. Ct. 804, 8Io.
TThe court of last -resort said in Monongahela N. Co. v. United
States, (1893) 148 U. S.312, 327, 13 Sup. Ct. 622, 626, that the amount
of compensation to which the owner of property taken by the federal
government is entitled is, in view of the just compensation provision
of the Fifth Amendment, strictly a judicial question. It is submitted
that this statement is incorrect and that in any event it is inapplicable
to rate regulation. Conceding that if the owner be not given what the
court considers just compensation the court may declare the taking
unconstitutional, it certainly doer not follow that the court may fix
the amount of compensation in the first instance or may apply any but
constitutional tests to the amount fixed. Indeed, the court also said in
the same opinion that the decision of Congress is not conclusive,
although without recognizing that this position is far different from the
one already referred to. And even if the court had actually decided the
case in accordance with its extremest language, we should still have
many earlier and later declarations by the same court that-the prescribing of future rates is a legislative or administrative act. See, e. g.,
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, (igoo) 176 U. S. 167, 173,
20 Sup. Ct. 336, 338, and notes 15, supra, and 41, 55 and 56, infra.
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tionably, but it is not obliged to do so. The power of legislative bodies to enact detailed legislation, unless expressly
forbidden by other provisions of the constitutions, is too
well recognized to be open to dispute. If the legislature
does not attempt to determine whether the conduct of individuals complies with regulations which it has laid down,
it does not infringe upon any power which is bestowed exclusively upon the courts by the constitutional provisions
which grant to them judicial power.
In addition to the regulative power which may be exercised only by the legislature 8 (except in so far as that
body authorizes local self-government) 19 the legislature possesses powers which other organs of government may exercise but may not exercise exclusively: thus there are many
administrative regulations which it may enact itself or the
20
making of which it may entrust to administrative organs,
and it may, within limits which we need not here consider,
make regulations concerning the internal organization and
2
methods of operation of both administrative 21 and judicial
organs, or it may entrust that power to the organs con23
cerned.
"

See note 26, infra.
See note 7, supra.

See note 6, supra, and the discussion of delegation of power, infra.
' See Goodnow, The Principles of the Administrative Law of the
United States, 123, 125.
"Brown on Jurisdiction, sec. 14; Wigmore on Evidence, secs. 7,
1353, 1354 ; Bondy, The Separation of Governmental Powers, (Columbia University Studies) 31, IOO; Banks v. State, (195o)
124 Ga. 15,
52 S. E. 74; State v. Barrett, (igo5) 138 N. C. 630, 50 S. E. 56, I L. R.
A. N. S. 626; In the Matter of the Estate of Stilwell, (1893) 139 N. Y.
337, 34 N. E. 777; Whiting v. Townsend, (1881) 57 Cal. 515; Coopers
Case, (i860o) 22 N. Y. 67, go; note 5, supra. See also State v. Pierre,
(1908) 121 La:, 46 So. 574; Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Byrne, (Io7)
Tenn., io4 S. W. 46o, 47o; People v. Hayne, (189o) 83 Cal. III, 23 Pac.

r, 7 L. RL A. 348; Brady v. CarteretR. Co., (1907) 7o N. J. E. 748, 67
Atl. 6o6. Compare In re Day, (I899) 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L.
R. A. 519; Herndon v. Imperial F. I. Co., (1892) i1 N. C. 384, i6
S. E. 465, 18 L. R. A. 547; State v. Noble, (1889) II8 Ind. 350, 21 N.
E. 244, 4 L. R. A. ioi; Houston v. Williams, (i859) 13 Cal. 24; Calvert v. Carstarphen, (19o3) 133 N. C. 25, 45 S. E. 353; Ex parte Griffiths, (1889) 118 Ind. 83, 2o N. E. 513, 3 L. R. A. 398; Bondy, op. cit.,
i68; and also In re Janitor of Supreme Court, (1874) 35 Wis. 410.
I Wayman v. Southard, (1825) io Wheat. 1, 42, 43, 46; Bank of the
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(9

LIMITED POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS.

Administrative organs possess only the powers which
have been entrusted to them by a constitution or by legislation. 24 Passing over clear grants of power by the constitutions with the remark that they may confer upon organs
which are granted administrative power more than merely
administrative power, and that in such cases decisions concerning merely administrative bodies may be inapplicable to
such organs, and, conversely, decisions concerning them
may be inapplicable to merely administrative organs, we
shall inquire simply what portion of the power which may
be exercised by the legislature may be granted by the legislature to administrative bodies without infringing the distribution of powers which is usually made by the constitutions.
DELEGATION OF POWER BY LEGISLATURE.

The courts have frequently determined that, except with
reference to local affairs, 25 a legislature may not delegate
U. S. v. Halstead, (1825) IO Wheat. 51, 61; Hudson v. Parker, (1895)
156 U. S. 277, 15 Sup. Ct. 450; Cooke v. Avery, (1893) 147 U. S. 375, 3
Sup. Ct. 34o; Stevens v. Truman, (1899) 127 Cal. 155, 59 Pac. 397;
White v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co., (1897) 79 Fed. 133; Winston v.
Stone, (1897) 102 Ky. 423, 43 S. W. 397; Anderson v. Levely, (1882)

58 Md.

192; Thompson v. Floyd, (1855) 2 Jones' L. (N. C.) 313. See
also State v. Struble, (igo5) 1g S. D. 646, 104 N. W. 465; Atlantic E.
Co. v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., (1892) 111 N. C. 463, 16 S. E. 393,
18 L. R. A. 393; Hildreth v. Crawford, (1884) 65 Iowa, 339, 343;
Coleman v. Newby, (1871) 7 Kan. 82; 8 Cyc. 835; note 6, supra.
See Interstate Cont. Comn. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co.,
167 U. S. 479, 17 Sup. Ct. 896; Interstate Com. Comn. v.
(897)
Alabama M. Ry. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 144, i8 Sup. Ct. 45; Board of R.
Comrs. v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., (x888) 17 Ore. 65, i9 Pac. 702, 2 L.
R. A. 195; United States v. Eaton, (1892) 144 U. S. 677, 12 Sup. Ct. 764;
Morrill v. Jones, (1883) io6 U. S. 466, i Sup. Ct. 423; 23 A. & E. Enc.
of L., 2d ed., 653; Goodnow, The Principles of the Administrative Law
of the United States, 46, 47, 95; People v. Healy, (19o7) 231 Ill. 629,
83 N. E. 453.
' On the power of the legislature to allow localities to govern themselves in some respects, see note 7, supra. That administrative and
judicial organs may be allowed to make regulations concerning their
own internal organization and methods of operation (see note 23,
supra) hardly seems to be an exception to the general rule.
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its power of deciding questions of public policy, 26 and in
this article the validity of that rule will be assumed.27 On
the other hand, although rate regulation may involve quesIn the following cases among others it has been actually decided
that power which is strictly legislative may not be delegated, and there
are dicta to that effect in many other cases: Central of Ga. Ry. Co. V.
Railroad Comn., (igo8) i6I Fed. 925, 985 (where the statute dealt with
rate-making by commission); State v. Great N. Ry. Co., (1907) 100
Minn. 445, in N. W. 289; Vallelly v. Board of Park Corers., (1907) N.
D., III N. W. 615; United States v. Matthews, (19o6) 146 Fed. 3o6;
People v. Board of Election Corers., (i9o6) 221 Ill. 9, 77 N. E. 321;
Rose v. State, (igo6) Ala., 40 So. 951; Fite v. State, (1905) i14 Tenn.
646, 88 S. W. 941, 1 L. R. A. N. S. 52o; State v. Budge, (9o5) 14 N.
D. 532, lO5 N. W. 724; King v. Concordia F. L Co., (i9o5) 14o Mich.
258, 1O3 N. W. 616; Phoenix . Co. v. Perkins, (19o5) ig S. D. 59,
xoi N. W. 111o; State v. Rogers, (1905) 71 Ohio St. 203, 73 N. E. 461;
Mitchell v. State, (1902) 134 Ala. 392, 32 So. 687; Gilhooly v. City of
Elizabeth, (igoi) 66 N. J. L. 484, 49 Atl. 11o6; Noel v. People, (19oo)
187 Ill. 587, 58 N. E. 616; Johnstown C. Assn. v. Parker, (1899) 45
N. Y. App. Div. 55, 6o N. Y. Supp loi5; Inhabitants of Township of
Bernardsv. Allen, (1898) 61 N. J. L. 228, 39 At. 716; In re Incorporation of North Milwaukee, (1896) 93 Wis. 616, 67 N. W. 1033; Dowling v. Lancashire L Co., (1896) 92 Wis. 63, 65 N. W. 738; Hovey v.
Commissioners of Wyandotte Co., (1896) 56 Kan. 577, 44 Pac. 17;
Anderson.v. ManchesterF. A. Co., (895) 59 Minn. 182, 191, 63 N. W.
241, 28 L. R. A. 6og, 61o; O'Neil v. American F. L Co., (895)
166 Pa.
72, 30 AtI. 943, 26 L. IL A. 715; State v. Gaster, (1893) 45 La. An.
636, 12 So. 739; Board of Harbor Corrs. v. Excelsior R. Co., (i89i)
88 Cal. 491, 26 Pac. 375; King v. Tennessee, (1889) 87 Tenn. 304, 10 S.
W. 509, 3 L. R. A. 210; Ex partte Cox, (1883) 6S Cal. 21; Pilkey v.
Gleason, (1856) I Iowa, 522; Barto v. Himrod, (1853) 8 N. Y. 483;
State v. Field, (1853) 17 Mo. 529. See also Commonwealth v. Addams,
(1894) 95 Kv. 588, 26 S. W. 581; State v. Gaunt, (1885) 13 Ore. 115,
9 Pac. 55; Kehler & Bro. v. Jack M. Co., (1876) 55 Ga. 639; and end
of note 2, supra. But, of course, the fact that Locke (On Civil Government, sec. 142) declared broadly that a legislature may not transfer the power of making laws, while it may cast some light upon the
intentions of those who long afterwards adopted the American constitutions, does not except for that purpose have any value whatever.
Concerning Locke's book see also Stephen, Horae Sabbaticae, II, 155,
156.
' The rule can be based only upon the purpose of those who, in
adopting the constitutions, distributed governmental powers. This purpose the courts have usually sought by reading the distributive clauses
not in the light of political theories predominant when the constitutions
were adopted but in the light of the common law principle that an
agent may not delegate his powers, although the state legislatures, and
apparently Congress, resemble Parliament more closely than they resemble mere agents. And, since the legislature may delegate some of
its powers: see notes 6, 23, supra, and 29, 59, 69, et seq., infra, the
common law does not furnish a complete interpretation of the provisions.-The men who adopted the various constitutions were influenced by a theory which was based upon an appreciative generalization of governmental conditions which, as some of those who -adopted
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tions of public policy,28 there are decisions that 29at least
some specific rates named by commission are valid.
the constitutions realized, did not fully accord with that generalization;
and in many of the constitutions it is not clear how closely those who
adopted them intended that theory to be followed in interpreting
general provisions. See The Federalist, Nos. 47 et seq.; Stevens,
Sources of the Constitution of the United States, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49, 57,
154, 155, 177. With the exception of Marr v. Enloe, (i83o) i Yerg.
(Tenn.) 452, where that was one of the grounds of the decision, there
seems to have been no case before 1847 in which legislation was actually declared unconstitutional upon the ground that legislative power
was delegated. And since then the courts as a general rule certainly
have not followed any theory consistently and intelligently. To an
amazing extent the decisions are either based upon fictions or based
upon cases which do not apply or the opinions do not notice distinctions
which are admitted by all who consider such distinctions. In spite of
frequent declarations by the courts that legislative power may not
be delegated, such opinions and decisions cast some doubt upon the
propriety of their ever declaring legislation unconstitutional upon the
ground that a constitution impliedly forbids a delegation of legislative
power: see 21 Harv. L. Rev. 206; Thayer, Life of Marshall, chap. 5.
Yet if it is clear that the legislature may not delegate a power which
another organ attempts to exercise, the courts have a stronger reason
for declaring that exercise unconstitutional than they ordinarily have
for declaring the action of another department of kovernment invalid, for the right of courts to decide whether legislation has been
passed by the body prescribed by the constitution is clearer than their
right to decide whether legislation passed in the proper manner is
constitutional: see language of Gibson, J., dissenting, in Eakin v.
Raub, (1825) 12 S. & R. (Pa.) 330, 349, 35 4 .- The court said in
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, (1888) 35 Fed. 866, 874, I L. R. A.
744, 750, "After all, the question is one more of form than of substance. The vital question with both shipper and carrier is that the
rates shall be just and reasonable, and not by what body they shall be
put in force." To just as great an extent the question whether the
President may order the punishment of a counterfeiter without trial is
one "more of form than of substance." And so is the question whether
in a common law suit in a federal court where the value in controversy
exceeds twenty dollars the defendant may be denied a trial by jury.
But the men who adopted some of our constitutions, at least, considered the forms of government important: see Pollock's Maine's Ancient Law, 175; Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 137, note.
"See pp. 40, 42, infra.
"State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (1888) 38 Minn. 281, 37
N. W. 782; Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Smith, (883) 7o Ga. 694; Tilley v.
Savannah, F. & W. R. Co., (881) 5 Fed. 641; McWhorter v. Pensacola & A. R. Co., (i888) 24 Fla. 417, 5 So. I29, 2 L. R. A. 504;
Storrs v. Pensacola & 4. R Co., (2892) 29 Fla. 617, 11 So. 226; and
see Trustees v. Saratoga G., E. L. & P. Co., (i9o8) i9I N. Y. 123, 83 N.
E. 693; Stone v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., (I885) 62 Miss. 607, 645, 21 A.
& E. R. Cas. 6, I6; Stone v. Natchez, J. & C. R. Co., (1885) 62 Miss. 646,
21 A. & F. R. Cas. 17; People v. Harper, (1878) 91 II1. 357; Southern
Ry. Co. v. Hunt, (igo8) Ind. App., 83 N. E. 721; Chicago, I & L. Ry.
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Calling attention to these two lines of cases, it is submitted that the legislature is the only governmental body which
may determine the principles upon which rates shall be regulated, and that while the legislature, when it names specific
rates, need not disclose the principles upon which it acts or
even consciously adopt any principles, that body may not
grant to any other organ of government any power whatever to name specific rates for future transportation without first laying down principles sufficient for the guidance
of that organ, although after the legislature has determined
the principles upon which rates shall be regulated it may
grant to an administrative organ power to name rates in
accordance with those principles, the power of that organ
depending upon the completeness with which principles have
been stated for its guidance. 30
Co. v. Railroad Comn., (i9o6) 38 Ind. App. 439, 450, 451, 78 N. E. 338,
342, 79 N. F. 520. Compare Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comn.,
(19o8) 161 Fed. 925, 985. We must distinguish from the above cases
the cases in which other courts have sustained other statutes which
declared that the determinations of the commissions should constitute prima facie evidence of what were the lawful rates: Chicago, B.
& Q. R. Co. v. Jones, (1894) 149 Ill. 361, 37 N. E. 247, 24 L R. A.
I41; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, (888) 35 Fed. 866, I L. R. A.
138 Fed. 753, affirmed,
744; Tift v. Southern Ry. Co., (905)
Southern Ry. Co. v. Tift, (9o7) 2o6 U. S. 428, 27 Sup. Ct. 709; State
v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., (igoo) 8o Minn. 191, 83 N. W. 6o;
Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co. v. Dey, (i8gi) 82 Iowa, 312, 48 N. W.
98, 12 L. R. A. 436; State v. Freemont, E. & M. V. R. Co., (1888) 23
Neb. 117, 36 N. W. 305, (1887) 22 Neb. 313, 35 N. W. 118. The
question of delegation of power was discussed only in the Illinois case,
the case in 35 Fed., and in State v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., (19o7) Kan.;
92 Pac. 6o6; Atlantic E. Co. v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., (i892) iii
N. C. 463, 16 S. E. 393, 18 L. R. A. 393, in the last two of which the
remarks were dicta. (See also Corporation Comn. v. Seaboard A. L.
System, (igoo) 127 N. C. 283, 288, 37 S. E. 266, 268.) And Portland &
0. C. R. Co. v. Grand T. Ry. Co., (1858) 46 Me. 69; Vermont & M.
R. Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co., (852) 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 369, were far
different from the above: in each case the court, under statutory authority, appointed commissioners to determine the rates which under
existing law one party to the action might charge the other party. State
statutes upon rate regulation by commission are collected in Beale &
Wyman, Railroad Rate Regulation, p. lo8i et seq.
' So also it seems that a legislature cannot constitutionally grant
to a commission power to permit or to refuse to permit combinations
between competing carriers without first laying down principles for the
guidance of the commission. It is obvious to any one who examines
the question dispassionately that some combinations between corn-
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Some of the courts in sustaining laws which authorized
commissions to name rates for future transportation have
said that, as economic conditions change from time to time,
rates can be named better by a commission than by the
legislature, which is not constantly in session. 31 This argument from convenience is certainly a strong one; and decisions that railroad commissions may name specific rates do
not necessarily conflict with the decisions that the legislature alone may determine the principles upon which the
government shall be conducted.
In declaring that a state might empower a commission to
regulate charges for gas and electric service, a court has
said that conditions in the several localities differed so
greatly that the legislature could not justly establish uniform rates for the entire state and that it would not be
practicable for the legislature itself to establish rates in
each of the communities.3 2 And the same position might
properly be taken with regard to charges for transportation. In both cases it is true that the legislature cannot
satisfactorily do more than declare the principles which the
commission shall apply; although in neither case does it
peting carriers are decidedly in the interest of the public, that some
are not injurious, while still others may prove to be against the public
interest. These combinations admit of classification, and it is the duty
of the legislature, when regulating them or when providing for their
regulation, to declare the lines of division or the principles by which
those lines may be clearly ascertained.-A statute of Minnesota which
attempted to delegate to a commission an unrestrained veto power over
proposed increases in the capitalization of railroads incorporated in that
state was declared unconstitutional in State v. Great N. Ry. Co., (1907)
ioo Minn. 445, I1 N. W. 289, IO L. R. A. N. S. 250.
'State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (1888) 38 Minn. 281, 37 N.
W. 782; Georgia, R. & B. Co. v. Smith, (1883) 7o Ga. 694; Tilley v.
Savannah, F. & W. R. Co., (i881) 5 Fed. 641. See also McWhorter v.
Pensacola & A. R. Co., (1888) 24 Fla. 417, 5 So. 129, 2 L. R. A. 504;
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, (1888) 35 Fed. 866, I L. R. A. 744;
Trustees v. Saratoga G., E. L. & P. Co., (igo8) 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E.

693,699.

, Trustees v. Saratoga G., E. L. & P. Co., (19o8) 191 N. Y. 123,
83 N. E. 693. And see State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (1888)
38 Minn. 281, 37 N. W. 782; Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Smith, (1883) 70
Ga. 694. For other practical arguments in support of the delegation of
power to administrative organs, see Young, The Relation of the Executive to the Legislative Power, Proc. Am. Pol. Sci. Assn., 1, 47.
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follow that the commission may be allowed to decide what
those guiding principles shall be.
Some of the courts have also sustained statutes which
authorized commissions to name rates upon the ground that
in those statutes the legislatures had declared what the law
should be and had left to the commissions questions of
fact.33 Certainly where definite standards are established
" See Trustees v. Saratoga G., E. L. & P. Co., (i9o8) 1gi N. Y. x23,
83 N. E. 693, 700, where the commission was empowered to determine
what were reasonable maximum rates; and State v. Chicago, M. & St.
P. Ry. Co., (1888) 38 Minn. 281, 300, 302, 37 N. W. 782, 787, 788,
where the statute provided that the charges should be equal and reasonable. In view of the illustrations used, the courts apparently had
this thought in mind in Tilley v. Savannah, F. & W. R. Co., (1881) 5
Fed. 641, 657, where the statute provided that if a railroad should
charge more than a fair and reasonable rate it should be deemed guilty
of extortion, and that a commission should name reasonable and just
rates; and in Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, (1888) 35 Fed. 866,
874, where the statute provided that if any railroad "shall charge . .
more than a fair and reasonable rate . . . . or shall make any
unjust or unreasonable charge . . . the same shall be deemed
guilty of extortion," and required a commission to make a schedule of
reasonable and maximum rates, such schedule to be prima facie evidence that the rates named therein were reasonable and just maximum
rates. In reference to the illustration in the case last cited, we may
remark in passing that in declaring that a carrier should be allowed
to earn three per cent. for every act of transportation the legislature
would be fixing an unpractical standard; and we may question whether
in declaring that the company should earn that percentage from its
business as a whole the legislature would be furnishing adequate
guidance for the regulation of the separate rates. In Georgia R. & B.
Co. v. Smith, (1883) 7o Ga. 694, (1888) 128 U. S. 174, 9 Sup. Ct. 47,
the statute provided that a railroad charging more than a fair and
reasonable rate should be deemed guilty of extortion, and provided for
the appointment of commissioners who should make schedules of just
and reasonable rates. The state court decided, to use the language of
the United States Supreme Court, "that it was expected, not that the
legislature would itself make specific regulations as to what should in
each case be a proper charge, but that it would simply provide the
means by which such rates should be ascertained and enforced." In
Chicago, L & L. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Conmu., (19o6) 38 Ind. App. 439,
451, 78 N. E-. 338, 342, 79 N. E. 520; Southern Ry. Co. v. Hunt, (i9o8)
Ind. App., 83 N. E. 721, 725, where the commission was directed, upon
complaint, to determine whether the rates charged were just and reasonable, and, if not, to fix just and reasonable rates, the court spoke
of the decisions of the commission as to whether a railroad's charges
were just and reasonable as determinations of questions of fact.. In the
Indiana cases, however, the court was not discussing the question of
delegation of legislative power. See also cases cited in note 29, supra,
concerning statutes by which the rates named by commissions furnished
prima facie evidence as to what were the lawful rates.
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by statute a grant of power to ascertain and state what
rates will conform to those standards does not violate the
rule that legislative power may not be delegated. This principle cannot be disputed. The only question is whether the
statutes have in reality left to the commissions merely the
determination of matters of fact. To this question, however, the courts have given but very little consideration.
On the other hand, the suggestion which has been made
in support of commission-made rates 34 that because the legislature may for historical reasons grant some self-government to localities 35 it may delegate legislative power to
other governmental organs is entirely unconvincing. The
fact that there is one exception to the rule does not justify
the creation of new exceptions. And since the distributive
clauses of the state constitutions do not apply to local governments3 6 but do apply to the central governments of
those states, there is obviously nothing in the argument,
which was made in support of rate regulation by a gas and
electricity commission, 3 7 that because a power may be
granted to administrative officers of a locality similar power
may be granted to administrative officers of the state.
Two opinions also refer to laws declaring that the judiciary may make rules of court.38

But allowing an organ to

regulate procedure before itself is far different from allowing an organ to make rules of substantive law. And the
contention that authorizing a commission to name rates is
similar to allowing the companies concerned to name their
own rates 39 is likewise unsound. A commission acts as an
"See Tilley v. Savannah, F. & W. R. Co., (I881) 5 Fed. 641; and
also People v. Harper, (1878) 91 Ill. 357. The opinion in the latter
case is criticised in note 73, infra.
See page 4, supra.

See page 5, supra.
Trustees v. Saratoga G., E. L. & P. Co., (i9o8) ig9 N. Y. T23, 83
N. E. 693.
"State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (1888) 38 Minn. 281, 37
N. W. 782; Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Smith, (1883) 70 Ga. 694.
"Tilley v. Savannah, F. & W. R. Co., (88)
5 Fed. 641, 656; McWhorter v. Pensacola & A. R. Co., (i888) 24 Fla. 417, 5 So. 129, 2 L. R.
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organ of government-it interferes with the conduct of
third parties in matters in which the commission is not
itself interested; while the officers of a railroad, although
doing what some governmental organ might do, do not
act as agents of the government but interfere with the conduct of others only in matters affecting the company
itself.
We shall examine later the position that an administrative body may be granted discretion in the establishment of
rates.40
The United States Supreme Court has never decided how
much power may be granted by Congress to the Interstate
Commerce Commission, 4 1 and the question whether the disA. 5o4.--On the converse of this proposition see Morrow v. Wipf,
S. D., 1i5 N. W. 1121, H127; People v. Board of Election
(9o8)
Corrs., (i9o6) 221 Ill. 9, 19, 77 N. E. 321, 323, where the courts also
failed to notice the distinction, which is pointed out in the text, and
declared that a legislature may not allow the officials of a political party
to determine the method by which that party shall nominate its candidates. The opinions are unconvincing. A legislature certainly does
not delegate legislative power when it allows an organization to decide
such questions for itself. If those decisions were sound a law which
provided that a railroad should charge two cents a mile for passenger
transportation unless its appropriate officers should fix different rates,
but that such officers might fix different rates, would have to be held
unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the railroad officials.
The cases are parallel.--On the other hand, in State v. Felton, (1908)
77 Ohio St. 554, 577, 84 N. E. 85, 89, the court by a large majority
decided that a law which authorized party officials to prescribe the
purpose, time, manner and conditions of holding a primary election and
the qualifications of electors did not delegate legislative power. See
also note 79, infra.
" See pages 36-38, infra.
" There is a dictum that "Congress might itself prescribe the rates,
or it might commit to some subordinate tribunal this duty:" Interstate
Com. Comn. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., (897) 167 U. S.
479, 494, 17 Sup. Ct. 896, 898. See also Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comn., (1896) 162 U. S. 197, 216, i6 Sup. Ct. 666, 674; dissenting opinion in Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, (i89o)
134 U. S.418, 464, 1o Sup. Ct. 462, 702, 704; and notes 55, 56, infra.
But this dictum does little, if anything, towards settling the point now
under discussion. And the same comment must be made upon the
following sentence from the opinion in Interstate Com. Comn. v.
Chicago G. W. Ry. Co., (i9o8) 209 U. S. i08, 117, 28 Sup. Ct. 493, 496,
"It is unnecessary to define the full scope and meaning of the prohibition found in sec. 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act [relating to
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tribution of powers by the state constitutions has been violated by any administrative order concerning rates has been
42
before that court only in the Railroad Commission Cases,
where the state court had already declared that the law
there considered did not violate the state constitution 4 3a decision which was binding upon all other courts. 44 The
United States Supreme Court did briefly announce its concurrence with the interpretation which the state court had
placed upon the state constitution. 45 But the attention of
discriminations], or even to determine whether the language is sufficiently definite to make the duties cast on the Interstate Commerce Commission ministerial, and therefore such as may legally be imposed upon
a ministerial body, or legislative, and therefore, under the federal
Constitution, a matter for congressional action, for, within any fair
construction of the terms 'undue or unreasonable,' the findings of the
circuit court place the action of the railroads outside the reach of condemnation."
" (1886) II6 U. S. 307, 347, 352, 6 Sup. Ct. 334, 348, 349, 388, 391,
1191; reversing Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Stone, (1884) 20 Fed. 270;
Illinois C. R. Co. v. Stone, (1884) 2o Fed. 468.
"Stone v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., (1885) 62 Miss. 607, 645, 21 A.
& E. R. Cas. 6, 16, where the only reference to the subject is as follows: "The act creating the railroad commission is not violative of
the i4th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, or of any
provision of the constitution of the state, in that it creates a commission and charges it with the duty of supervising railroads ;" unless there
is some reference to the subject in the declaration, "We hold that the
state had the right to create an agency of the state to exercise such
supervision as it may lawfully employ over railroads within its
limits." See comment on Stone v. Natchez, J. & C. R. Co. in note 46,
infra.
""If a state court has decided that a law is in harmony with the
state constitution its validity, so far as the state constitution is concerned, cannot be questioned elsewhere :" Patterson, The United States
and the States Under the Constitution, 2d ed., p. 282; and see Smith v.
Jennings, (907) 206 U. S.276, 278, 27 Sup. Ct. 61o, 611; West v. Louisiana, (1904) 194 U. S. 258, 24 Sup. Ct. 650.
' The court stated the contention that the act conferred both legislative and judicial powers on the commission and was therefore repugnant
to the constitution of Mississippi, and made simply this reply, "The
Supreme Court of Mississippi has decided . . . that the statute is
not repugnant to the constitution of the state 'in that it creates a commission and charges it with the duty of supervising railroads.' To
this we agree, and this is all that need be decided in this case:" 116
U. S. 336, 6 Sup. Ct.347.-In Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, (1888) 35
Fed. 866, 875, in answer to the contention that legislative power was
delegated to commissioners in the statute there considered, the court
said that "the validity of the act of the state of Mississippi, delegating
like power to a board of railroad commissioners, was before the Su-
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all the courts which considered that law was devoted almost
exclusively to other constitutional questions,"8 so that it
seems that even if the Supreme Court had had the right to
pass upon the validity of the delegation of power, its decision upon that point would be of no greater value as a
precedent than was that casual decision upon the commerce
clause in the Granger Cases4 7 which was overruled in
48
Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois.
In Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Tompkis 4 9 and Minpreme Court of the United States, and though this specific objection
was made by counsel to its validity, the act was sustained," without,
however, any special reference being made to this question in the opinion.-An examination of unreported portions of the briefs filed in the
Supreme Court shows that counsel did there discuss, with ordinary
ability, the question of delegation of legislative power to an administrative body. And in 62 Miss. at 626 there are references to the question of delegation of power in a few authorities cited in a brief against
the law. Were it not for the latter, we might say that, so far as shown
by the reports of any of the cases, the contention that the statute was
not in accordance with the distribution of powers by the state constitution might have meant merely that if the state had any control whatever over the rates of a railroad the charter of which had granted to
it in general terms the right to regulate its own rates, that control
could be exercised only through a strictly judicial body. In Illinois C.
R. Co. v. Stone, (1884) 2o Fed. 468, 471, the court said, "The question
of what is reasonable compensation in such cases is one alone for
judicial ascertainment, when not fixed by the charter, and no power
is reserved therein, thereafter to fix it."
" In addition to the cases cited above, see Stone v. Natchez, J. &
C. R. Co., (1885) 62 Miss. 646, 21 A. & E. R. Cas. i7, which involves
simply the impairment of contract clause. The court there says that the
commission merely secured conformity by the road with the implied
condition in its charter to carry for reasonable rates. "The final test
of reasonablness of rates is not with the railroad commission, but, as
before, with the government, through its judiciary. Fixing rates by the
commission is not final and conclusive against a railroad company. It is
only prima facie correct, and may be tested by the courts. If the action
of the commission is just, it should prevail. If it is not it may be assumed that it will not. Of that none should complain. The concession
made in the bill of the appellee of the right of judicial control to prevent extortion and unjust discrimination is an admission of the right of
government control; and if the state can control or supervise at all it
may select the agency through which to exert its right." But it does
not follow that the legislature may select an agency as freely as the
state itself might do it, and that point is not discussed.
" Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, (1876) 94 U. S. 155, 163; Peik v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., (1876) 94 U. S. 164, 177, 178.
"(1886)
118 U. S. 557, 566-569, 7 Sup. Ct. 4, 7-9.
" (1900) 176 U. S. 173, 20 Sup. Ct. 336; (1898) go Fed. 363.

OF POWERS IN THE CONSTITUTIONS

neapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota" the question of
the delegation of legislative power was not discussed either
by the court of last resort or by the lower courts. In
Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Smith,5 ' while the court referred to
the decision of the state court upon the constitutionality of
the delegation of power, it properly refrained from com52
ment thereon. And in Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co.
it had been shown in the lower court5 3 that the state of
Texas had considered it advisable to amend its constitution
in order to authorize the regulation of rates by commission;
therefore, while the Supreme Court did say5 4 that a state
may regulate by means of a commission, that case certainly
does not show that in the absence of an express provision
in the state constitution a legislature may bestow upon a
commission as much power over rates as the legislature
itself might exercise.
The court of last resort has said at times that the naming
of specific rates for future transportation is a legislative
power,5 5 and at times that it is an administrative
power, 6 and the court has also appeared undecided upon
this point. 57 Yet, as we have already observed58 that there
are some powers which may be exercised by the legislature
itself, but the exercise of which is not confined strictly to
the legislature and may, therefore, be assigned by it to an
" (igo2) 186 U. S. 257, 22 Sup. Ct. 900; State v. Minneapolis & St.

L. R. Co., (igoo) 8o Minn. 191, 83 N. W. 6o.
(1888) 128 U. S. 174, 178, 9 Sup. Ct. 47, 48.
(1894) 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047.

"Mercantile T. Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., (1892) 51 Fed. 529, 532.
154 U. S. at 393, 394, 14 Sup. Ct. at 1053.

"McChord v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (19o2) x83 U. S. 483, 495,
22 Sup. Ct. x65, i69; Interstate Com. Comn. v. Alabama M. Ry. Co.,
(I897) i68 U. S. 144, 162, 18 Sup. Ct. 45, 47; Interstate Com. Comn. v.
Cincinnati,N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., (1897) 167 U. S. 479, 499, 500, 5o,
505, 506, 511, 17 Sup. Ct. 896, 900, 901, 902, 903, 905.

"St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, (1895) 156 U. S. 649, 663, 15 Sup.
Ct. 484, 490; Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., (894) 154 U. S. 362,
394, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047, 1053.

See also note 46, supra.
154 U. S. 362, 397, 14

"Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., (1894)

Sup. Ct. 1047, ,054.
U p. 4, supra.
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administrative organ, these cases need not confuse us.
Taken together they indicate no more than that a commission may not name specific rates without legislative authori-

zation, but that a commission may be authorized to ascertain facts as to rates and to state in specific form principles established by the legislature.
The court has sustained several federal statutes which

delegated power to administrative or executive officers and
which were attacked upon the ground that the power delegated was legislative,5 9 the court saying that the officers
were merely authorized to ascertain facts and to apply the
law in accordance with those facts. In some of the cases
this explanation of the statute is a rather strained one;60
but the actual decisions in those cases are more than off-set
by the reason which the court gave in support of the decisions.61 And while the court has sustained legislation
which delegated to executive officers distinctively congressional power concerning the Philippine Islands, 62 those decisions cannot justify similar legislation for territory which
is under the Constitution of the United States.
The court has also sustained a federal law which allowed
local authorities to make certain "supplementary regulations" concerning the acquisition of title to public lands.0 3
" Union B. Co. v. United States, (19o7)

204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct

367; and cases there cited. And see St. Louis, L M. & S. Ry. Co. v.
Taylor, (19o8) 210 U. S. 28r, 287, 26 Sup. Ct. 616, 617.
, Consider criticisms in dissenting opinion in Field v Clark, (1892)
143 U. S. 649, 697, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, So6; Gilhooly v. City of Elizabeth,
(igoi) 66 N. J. L. 484, 486, 49 Atl. 11o6, 1107; and criticism of similar
legislation in Prentice and Egan, The Commerce Clause of the Federal
Constitution, 313.
On the bearing of Field v. Clark, (1892)

143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup.

Ct. 495, on railroad rate regulation, see also Olney, Railroad Rate Making by Congress, 18i N. A. Rev. 490; Peck, Governmental Regulation
of Railroad Rates, 13 Am. Lawyer, 485, 486; Whitney, The Reciprocity
Acts of 189o, 31 Am. L. Reg. 186, 187.
" United States v. Heinszen, (1907) 206 U. S. 370, 27 Sup. Ct. 742;
Dorr v. United States, (1904) 195 U. S. 138, 24 Sup. Ct. 808. See also
The Louisa Simpson, (1871) 2 Sawyer, 57, 6r, 71, 15 Fed. Cas. 953,
955, 958.
"Butte C. W. Co. v. Baker, (19o5) 196 U. . ig, 2s5 Sup. Ct. 211.
See also United States v. Ormsbee, (1896) 74 Fed. 2o7.
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The opinion does not contain a thoroughly satisfactory discussion of the question involved, 64 yet the reason for the
decision may be said to be that the court thought that the
purpose for which the power had been given to Congress
had been sufficiently observed by the regulations which Congress had itself prescribed, and as vast interests would
suffer from a decision that the federal statute was unconstitutional the court would not so decide where the invalidity was not clear.65 As the court did not -notice it, we need
not lay much stress upon the fact that the local authorities
were not merely administrative, and that apparently the
"supplementary regulations" were legitimate exercises of
local self-government. 60 The decision that the power to
"See 196 U. S. 125, r26, 25 Sup. Ct. 213. The question is how far
the power of Congress is exclusive. The court does not show whcther
the owner of the land had actually granted to its agent, Congress, permission to delegate a portion of the power committed to it.-Granting that Congress thought that it was acting for the best, that fact does
not answer the constitutional question.-The question is not whether the
power is legislative in its nature, but whether it is entrusted to the exclusive control of Congress, so that even if the court could say boldly
that neither the statute nor the "supplementary regulations" were in
any aspect legislative in character the problem would not be entirely
solved.
"A statute must always be upheld unless its invalidity is clear, regardless of the amount involved.
"In this case the regulations were made by a state; but a state could
not exercise such power over interstate rates: see Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, (1889) 129 U. S. 141, 9 Sup. Ct. 256; and also McCornick v.
Western U. T. Co., (1897) 79 Fed. 449, 451; compare In re Rahrer,
(189r) 140 U. S. 545, iI Sup. Ct. 865.-Perhaps the statute was
analogous to that considered in In re Rahrer, and merely withdrew a
withdrawable federal restraint upon a state's power over property
within its borders. Between the exclusive power of the federal
government and the exclusive power of the states there are fields of
jurisdiction which Congress may place under state control, which are of
such a nature that we might say that the state and federal governments held them in common because of vicinage to the exclusive
domains of each, were it not for the rule of the supremacy of federal
law, a rule found in the Constitution but sometimes misapplied; in addition to In re Rahrer see Patterson, The United States and the States
-Under the Constitution, 2d ed., p. 269, note; and, by way of analogy,
p. 4, supra. Thus, while Congress may not authorize the states to coin
money it may authorize them to tax federal agencies which are within
their borders: see Patterson, op. cit., p. 48; and also U. S. Constitution,
Art. I, sec. zo.-In connection with this note in general consider also
Kansas v. Colorado, (1907) 206 U. S. 46, 92, 27 Sup Ct. 655, 665; Allen
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make those "supplementary regulations" had not been
clearly shown to belong exclusively to Congress, while it
may have some bearing upon the question how far the
power of Congress under the commerce clause is exclusive,
does not constitute a decision upon the extent to which the
power of Congress is exclusive under any clause of 67the
Constitution other than the one considered in that case.
The Supreme Court of the United States has also referred to the distribution of governmental powers in several
cases involving state legislation, but its remarks upon the
subject in those cases were of comparatively little value.68
Turning again to the decisions of state courts, we must
note that they have. frequently sustained legislation by
which administrative officers were empowered to apply the
law in accordance with facts to be ascertained by those officers. Thus they have sustained legislation by which a commission was authorized to mark boundary lines between
27 Sup. Ct. 95; Woods & Sons v Carl,
(I9o6) 203 U. S. 358, 27 Sup. Ct. 99; 2 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 347.

v. Riley, (i9o6) 203 U. S. 347,

" "The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those im-

portant subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature
itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be
made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details :" Wayman v. Southard, (1825) io Wheat.
r, 43"Michigan C. R. Co. v. Powers, (i9o6) 201 U. S. 245, 26 Sup. Ct.
459, where the distribution was clearly directed by the state constitution;
Dreyer v. Illinois, (1902) 187 U. S. 71, 23 Supt. Ct. 28; St. Louis C. C.
Co. v. Illinois, (19o2) x85 U. S. 203, 22 Sup. Ct. 616. The two latter
cases had been taken up from the state court of last resort. The rule
as to the distribution of governmental powers is distinctly separate
from other rules of the constitutions, however much laws which violate
that rule may also violate other rules. The court said in Atlantic C. L.
2o6 U. S. I, i9, 27 Sup. Ct. 585,
R. Co. v. North C. Corp. Comn., (197o)
591, that state regulation of railroads "may be exerted either directly by
the legislative authority or by administrative bodies endowed with
power to that end." The case came up from the supreme court of the
state, and the question of delegation of power was not considered.
Every one must admit that a legislature may confer some power upon
commissions. But the case does nothing whatever toward clearing up
the question of how much power a legislature may bestow upon a commission without violating that distribution of powers which is usually
made by the constitutions.
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counties, 69 a commission was authorized to determine the
efficiency of a voting-machine the use of which, if efficient,
was directed by law,7 ° examining boards were authorized
to inquire into the qualifications of persons seeking to exercise designated public occupations and to license those
who were properly qualified, 7 1 state boards were authorized
Trinity County v. Mendocino County, (1907) 151 Cal. 279, 90 Pac.

685. Although the line was marked incorrectly jt constituted the
legal boundary. In Kennedy v. Mayor, (19o2) 24 R. I. 461, 53 AtI. 317,
the court sustained a law which directed the appointment of a commission to divide a city into wards and voting-districts. The correctness
of the decision is not quite so clear as the correctness of the decision
in Trinity County v. Mendocino County, but it seems to be sound. See
also It re Hunter, (i9o8) Minn., 116 N. W. 922, 924. Rouse v. Thompson, (9o7) 228 Ill. 522, Sr N. E. iuo9, was different from the above
cases. In it the court declared unconstitutional an act authorizing
political committees to establish delegate districts in their respective
counties. The decision can be supported, if at all, only upon the ground
that so much discretion was allowed to the committees that their decisions would be of a legislative nature, and that the committees were
of such a character that legislation by them could not be justified as
exercises of local self-government. But while the court uses language
which taken alone would indicate that it considered the work strictly
legislative in character, it deprives that language of any importance by
apparently admitting that the work could be entrusted to an administrative organ and insisting that the committees could not constitutionally
be made governmental organs. In taking the latter ground the court
seems to be in error: see 8 Cyc. 831; Scholle v. State, (19oo) 9o Md.
729, 46 Atl. 326, 5o L. R. A. 411; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v.
Taylor, (19o8) 21o U. S. 281, 287, 28 Sup. Ct. 616, 617; dissenting opinion in Rouse v. Thompson; discussion of this case in 21 Harv. L. Rev.
215, 216.

"°Elwell v. Comstock, (19o6) 99 Minn. 26r, log N. W. 113, 698, 7
A. N. S. 621.
T
Ex parte McManus, (1907) 151 Cal. 331, 90 Pac. 702, state board
of architecture-see concurring opinion; ln re Thompson, (1904) 36
Wash. 377, 78 Pac. 899, state board of dental examiners; State v.
Briggs, (Jgo4) 45 Ore. 366, 77 Pac. 750, 78 Pac. 361, state board of
barber examiners; Er parte Whitley, (1904) 144 Cal. 167, 77 Pac. 879,
state board of dental examiners; Ex parte Gerino, (19o4) 143 Cal. 412,
77 Pac. 166, state board of medical examiners; State v. Thompson,
(i9oi) i6o Mo. 333, 6o S. W. 1077, 54 L. R. A. 950, state auditor authorized to license persons of good character to make books on horse
races at race courses of good repute; State v. Heinemann, (1891) 8o
Wis. 253, 49 N. W. 88, state board of pharmacy. See also State v.
Chittenden, (i9o6) 127 Wis. 468, 1O7 N. W. 500; Hildreth v. Crawford, (1884) 65 Iowa, 339, 21 N. W. 667; U. S. Rev. Stats., secs. 4439444 5 Fed. Stats. An. 398-4oo. And there have been a number of
cases in which similar statutes were sustained without any consideration
of the question of delegation of legislative power. Contra, Harmon v.
State, (19o2) 66 Ohio St. 249, 64 N. E. I17, 58 L. R. A. 68, where a
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to issue quarantine and other regulations for the protection of the health of the community,7 2 and other similar
or supposedly similar delegations of power were made.7"
statute which authorized examiners to license steam engineers who
should be found "trustworthy and competent" was declared invalid on
the ground that it delegated legislative power, The only case cited
by the court was Mathews v. Murphy, referred to in note 73, infra, and
it is not clear that that case turned upon the question of delegation of
legislative power. Compare State v. Gardner, (I898) 58 Ohio St. 599, 51
N. E. 136, 41 L. R. A. 689. In connection with Harmon v. State consider also cases cited in note 73, infra.
" Pierce v. Doolittle, (i9o6) 130 Iowa, 333, io6 N. W. 75 r , 6 L. R.
A. N. S. 143; Blue v. Beach, (igoo) 155 Ind. 121, 56 N. B. 89, 5o L. R
A. 64. See also Isenhour v. State, (igoi) 157 Ind. 517, 6o N. E. 40;
Hurst v. Warner, (1894) io2 Mich 238, 6o N. W. 440, 26 L. R. A.
484; Koppala v. State, (o7) Wyo., 89 Pac. 576, 579; Cooper v. Schult.
(i866) 32 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 1o7 (in the last of which the courts sustained a broad grant of power to commissioners appointed by the
governor and senate: see pp. 112, 124) ; Walker v. Towle, (rgoi) 156
Ind. 639, 59 N. E. 20, 53 L. R. A. 749; and the following cases in
which live stock quarantine regulations were sustained: State v.
Southern Ry. Co., (19o6) 141 N. C. 846, 54 S. E. 294; Commonwealth v.
Cooper, (I9O2) 27 Pa. Co. Ct. i99; State v. Rasmussen, (i9oo) 7
Idaho, r, ir, 59 Pac. 933, 936. In.Ex parte Cox, (1883) 63 Cal. 2r, where
a statute was declared unconstitutional, too broad a power had been
granted to the viticultural commissioners. In State v. Burdge, (1897)
95 Wis. 390, 70 N. W. 347, 37 L- R. A. 157, the court may have decided correctly in sustaining the same objection to a statute (as interpreted by the state board of health) which dealt with dangerous contagious diseases. But in Schaezlein v. Cabaniss, (902) 135 Cal. 466, 67
Pac. 755, 56 L. R. A. 733, the court seems to have been in error in
declaring unconstitutional a statute which provided that if in any
factory there were produced dangerous substances that were liable to
be inhaled by the employees, and it appeared to the commissioner of
labor statistics that by the use of some mechanical contrivance such
inhalation could be to a great extent prevented, he should require the
use of such contrivance. With that case compare, in addition to the
cases cited above, Arms v. Ayer, (ipoI) 192 Ill. 6oi, 61 N. . 851, which
concerned a law conferring upon factory inspectors power as to the
erection of fire escapes; State v. Vickens, (I9O5) 186 Mo. 103, 84 S. W.
908, which concerned a law conferring upon factory inspectors powers
the extent of which is not clearly shown in the opinion; and Spiegler v.
City of Chicago, (i9o5) 216 Ill. 114, 128, 74 N. B. 718, 722, which
concerned an ordinance which declared that devices, to be approved by
the commissioner of public works, should be placed upon oil-wagons to
prevent the spilling of oil.
" See page i6 and notes 69, 72, supra; and language of
court in Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comn., (i9o8)
16r Fed. 925, at 986. In Hand v. Stapleton, (i9o3) r35 Ala. 156, 33 So.

689, commissioners were directed to construct county buildings at a new
location if they should find that the work could be paid for without
an increase in the tax rate. In People v. Harper, (1878) 91 Ill. 357,
commissioners were authorized to name inspection fees: the legislature
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While the courts have not always sustained statutes upon
those subjects, partly because some of the statutes which
were declared unconstitutional differed in character from
those which were sustained, and partly because some courts
stated the principle to be followed, though the court does not dwell on
this fact but sustains the statute with unsound reasoning. In Lothrop
v. Stedman, (1875) 42 Conn. (Supp.) 583, Fed. Cas. No. 851g, a commissioner was directed to determine and announce whether a company
made up a deficiency in its assets, thus avoiding a conditional repeal of
its charter. Local option and similar laws have been frequently sustained upon the ground that the power delegated was merely that of
determining questions of fact. It seems that that ground does not
furnish a correct basis for those decisions: see note 7, supra. It may,
possibly, answer objections to statutes considered in State v. Bryan,

(905) 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929, 953; Leeper v. State, (1899) 103 Tenn.
500, 524, 53 S. W. 962, 967, 48 L R. A. 167, x72; and to some portions

of the statute considered in In re Gilbert E. Ry. Co., (1877) 70 N. Y.
361, 366, 374; In re New York E. R. Co., (1877) 70 N. Y. 327, though it
seems that other portions of the New York statute can be supported
better, if not only, upon the ground that the power was granted to
local authorities: see page 4, supra. A statute which authorized
county commissioners to determine the width of tires which must
be used for the transportation of heavy loads upon the public
roads of their respective counties, was sustained in State v. Messenger,
(Igoo) 63 Ohio St 398, 59 N. E. io5, not only upon the ground that
a power of local government was thereby granted to local authorities,
but also upon the ground that those authorities were directed to determine questions of fact. In People v. Delaware & H. C. Co., (I898)
32 N. Y. App. Div. 120, 52 N. Y. Supp. 85o, affirmed (igoi) 165 N. Y.
362, 59 N. _. 138, the court decided that legislative power was not
delegated by a statute which empowered commissioners, acting judicially, it was said, to determine the necessity of railroad accommodations. And statutes authorizing commissions to issue orders concerning the construction and operation of railroads have been enforced without any consideration of the question of delegation of legislative power in a number of cases. On the other hand, in Noel v. People,
(1900) 187 Ill. 587, 58 N. E. 616, the court decided that legislative
power was delegated by a statute which granted to a board of pharmacy an unconditional power to say, as to some parts of the state, what
individuals who were not registered pharmacists should be permitted to
sell patent and proprietary medicines and domestic remedies, and under
what restrictions those drugs should be sold, although the court admitted the validity of that part of the statute which provided that no one
might sell medicines which he had prepared or compounded himself
unless he were a registered pharmacist. And in Mathews v. Murphy,
(i9oI) 23 Ky. L. Rep. 75o, 63 S. W. 785, 54 L. R. A. 415, the court
decided that the state board of health might not revoke a license to
practice medicine because of "grossly unprofessional conduct of a character calculated to deceive or defraud the public," although admitting
the validity of that part of the statute which authorized the board to
pass upon the qualifications of persons seeking licenses to practice
medicine; yet it is doubtful whether that case turned upon the ques-

tion of delegation of legislative power.
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have taken a stricter view of the limitations upon delegations of power by the legislature than have been taken by
other courts, it seems clear that constitutional statutes upon
those subjects may be framed. Such questions, for instance, as the appropriate preventive of the spread of small
pox, and whether a man possesses the normal qualifications
of an architect, are undeniably questions of fact.
But there is a clear difference between determining the
precise application of a law established by the legislature
and stating in specific form a regulation which is not the
application of a law established by the legislature. Or, to
refer more definitely to railroad commissions, while a legislature certainly may authorize such a commission to investigate questions concerning rates and to state in specific
form the rates which may be charged thereafter, if it has
clearly established the principles which are to be applied by
the commission, the cases which we have just considered
do not warrant the assertion that the legislature may endow the commission with a wide discretion as to the rates
which shall be fixed. We have seen from other authorities
that while the legislature may authorize a commission to
ascertain facts and to apply the law in accordance with
those facts, it must point out the facts which are to be ascertained, it must determine the law which is to be ap74
plied.
The courts have also held that a statute the operation of
which depends upon a contingency does not necessarily
delegate legislative power. It may declare completely the
principles of governmental action, although other forces determine the result of that declaration of principles. Thus
the treatment of a foreign corporation may be made to depend upon the treatment which the home state of that corporation extends to corporations of the state whose legisiation is being considered;75 commissioners may be author" See cases cited in note 26, supra.

"People v. Fire Assn. of Phila., (1883)
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-ized to construct new county buildings if they shall find
that the work will not require an increase in the tax rate76
to remove de facto a county seat upon the erection of suitable buildings at a new location7 7 or to remove the county
records to another town and erect a court house there if
the town or its citizens shall, to the satisfaction of the commissioners and without expense to the county, provide suitable temporary accommodations and a suitable building
site ;78 a legislature may require a railroad company to stop
its trains at a designated place if individuals shall, within a
given time, there erect a station building and convey it,
with the land thereunder, to the company ;79 a legislature
Co. V. Welch, (1883) 29 Kan. 672; Home I. Co. v. Swigert, (1882) 104
11. 653; and see Talbott v. Fidelity & C. Co., (189) 74 Md. 536, 545, 22
At. 395, 398. Contra, Clark & Murrel v. Port of Mobile, (188o) 67
Ala. 217. It is submitted that, while the decisions in support of the
statutes are sound, some of the cases which the Kansas and Illinois
courts cite with approval were not legitimate instances of contingent
legislation. In Brig Aurora v. United States, (1813) 7 Cranch, 382, the
court sustained an act by which an embargo resulted upon action by
Great Britian. And in Field v. Clark, (1892) 143 U. S.649, 12 Sup.
Ct. 495, the court sustained a federal reciprocity statute in which the
contingency was not indicated as definitely as in the above statutes.
T
Hand v. Stapleton, (igo3) 135 Ala. 156, 33 So. 689.
"Peck v. Weddell, (1867) 17 Ohio St. 271.
" Walton v. Greenwood, (1872) 6o Me. 356.

'"State v. New Haven & N. Co., (876) 43 Conn. 351. The court
gave but slight consideration to the question. In Mayor v. Clunet,
(1865) 23 Md. 449, 466-470, after a fuller discussion, the court sustaned an ordinance for the opening of a street which provided that it
should not go into effect until designated individuals had adjusted
claims against the city arising out of a prior ordinance for the same
purpose which had been repealed after it had been partly executed. On
the other hand, in Owensboro & N. R. Co. v. Todd, (I89I) 91 Ky. 175,
15 S. W. 56, II L. R. A. 285, the court, without giving satisfactory
reasons, declared that legislative power was delegated by an act which
provided that, where land for the right of way had been given to a
railroad company, the owners of adjoining lands might thereafter require the company to fence the right of way at its own expense; and
in Loughbridge v. Harris, (1871) 42 Ga. 500, is an unmistakably incorrect declaration that a mill dam act delegated legislative power. See
also note 39, supra.-As a legislature does not necessarily allow an individual to shape the policy of the government whenever it makes the
operation of a statute contingent upon his action or decision, it seems
that it may at times make the operation of a statute to depend upon his
decision whether or not he will contribute from his own possessions or
whether he will waive or claim rights against other individuals or
against the state, even though it may not grant to any one a right to in-
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may repeal the charter of a companywith the proviso that
the repeal shall not go into effect if the company shall by a
named date make up a deficiency in its assets ;80 and, though
it is questionable whether this is really contingent legislation, the legislature may doubtless empower individuals to
do certain acts without compelling them to do so, as in the
statutes authorizing the formation of corporations.
Yet obviously it does not follow that because contingent
legislation may be constitutional therefore a statute must be
valid if its operation is uncertain. In the cases which we
have already considered the policy of the state was determined only by the legislature; but it would be far otherwise
if the contingency consisted of the will of another organ of
government. It is true that in a number of cases the courts
have sustained statutes which in reality delegated legislative
power to the voters or the authorities of localities, upon the
ground that in each case the operation of the statute was
contingent."' And yet, without criticising the actual deciterfere with the property or conduct of others save for the obtaining of
rights which are granted to, or already belonged to, himself.The
court in In re New York E. R. Co., (1877) 70 N. Y. 327, 343, 344, gave
an unsound reason for saying that the commission must be allowed
to determine for the incorporators a number of questions concerning
the organization of the company.
"Lothrop v. Stedman, (1875) 42 Conn. (Supp.) 583, Fed. Cas. No.
85g.
, See, e. g., People v. McBride, (19o8) Ill.,
84 N. E. 865, 872; Picton
v. Cass County, (i9o4) 13 N. D. 242, ioo N. W. 711; Ansley v. Ainsworth, (1902) 4 Ind. Ter. 308, 69 S. W. 884; State v. Cooley, (1896)
65 Minn. 406, 68 N. W. 66; Lum v. Mayor, (1895) 72 Miss. 950, IS So.
476; State v. Pond, (1887) 93 Mo. 6o6, 6 S.W. 469; People v. Hoffman,
(Y886) 116 Ill. 587, 5 N. E. 596; Schulherr v. Bordeaux, (x886) 64
Miss. 59, 8 So. 2o1; Clarke v. Rogers, (1883) 8r Ky. 43; People v. Citv
of Butte, (88)
4 Mont. 174, 1 Pac. 414; Guild v. City of Chicago,
(1876) 82 Ill. 472; Fell v. State, (1875) 42 Md. 71; Locke's Appeal,
(1873) 72 Pa. 491; Alcorn v. Hamer, (86o) 38 Miss. 652 (in which
case the briefs were elaborate) ; Bull v. Read, (1855) 13 Gratt. (Va.)
78; Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Comrs., (1852) 1 Ohio St. 77; and
also State v. Fountain, (igo8) Del., 69 At. 926, 934; Thalheimer v.
Board of Suprs., (i9o8) Ariz., 94 Pac. i29; Ward v. State, (1908)
Ala., 45 So. 655; State v. Kline, (907) Ore., 93 Pac. 237; Fouts v. Hood
River, (19o5) 46 Ore. 492, 8r Pac. 370, x L. R. A. N. S.483; In re Neu
York E. R. Co., (1877) 70 N. Y. 327; State v. O'Neill, (1869) 24 Wis.
149; State v. Hunter, (1888) 38 Kan. 578, 17 Pac. 177 (in which case the
appointment of commissioners and the exercise of powers by them
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sions, we must note that not only does the reason given in

support of them appear to be insufficient when considered
by itself,82 but its unsoundness is further shown by the fact
that if the statutes were sustainable only upon that reason
the decisions would be flatly inconsistent with the decisions
that the legislature may not submit to the voters of the

entire state the question whether or not a law shall become
operative. 3 On the other hand, no question of the consistency of the two lines of decisions could arise if the former had been based upon the ground that- the legislature
84
may grant some self-government to the localities.
Nor may any right of the legislature to submit the questions whether or when a statute shall be executed 5 be based
were acts administrative in their nature for the improvement, where
necessary, of the execution of a law the excution of which had been
already ordered); Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., 167;
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 2d ed., p. 170; Oberholtzer, The
Referendum in America, 328. In some of the earlier decisions, while
the courts hold that the statutes are constitutional, they apparently
consider that a statute may be so worded that after a vote is taken the
constitutionality of a condition subsequent will be unimportant: that in
case of a vote to enforce the law the condition may be ignored: see
State v. Parker, (1857) 26 Vt. 357, 363; Alcorn v. Hamer, (i86o) 38
Miss. 652; although in case of a contrary vote, whether the condition
were constitutional or not, the statute could not be enforced.
' The distinction between valid and invalid contingent legislation is
further brought out in People v. Fire Assn. of Phila., (1883) 92 N. Y.
311, 322, 323; Barto v. Himrod, (1853) 8 N. Y. 483, 490, 495; Ex
parte Wall, (1874) 48 Cal. 279, 315; Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Railroad
Comn., (i9o8) I6I Fed. 925, 986.
" See note 87, infra.
" See page 4, supra.
' On the point that it was not the statute but the operation of the
statute which was contingent, see Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Comrs.,
(1852) i Ohio St. 77; Locke's Appeal, (1873) 72 Pa. 491; Picton v.
Cass County, (19o4) 13 N. D. 242, ioo N. W. 711; Clarke v. Rogers,
(1883) 81 Ky. 43; People v. City of Butte, (1881) 4 Mont. 174, I Pac.
414; People v. Reynolds, (1848)

5 Gil. (Ill.) i; State v. Kline, (1907)

Ore., 93 Pac. 237. In the Ohio case the court said, p. 88, "The law is,
therefore, perfect, final, and decisive in all its parts, and the discretion
given only relates to its execution. It may be employed or not employed; if employed, it rules throughout; if not employed, it still remains the law, ready to be applied whenever the preliminary condition is
performed. The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
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upon its undoubted right to allow administrative bodies to
decide some questions concerning the execution of statutes
which do not involve the desirability of governmental action. 6
As just stated, the weight of authority is decidedly against
the constitutionality of a submission to the voters of the
entire state of the question whether or not a law shall become operative;87 and yet a concession of the validity of
such legislation would not involve a concession of the validity of legislation which should grant a similar veto power
to an administrative organ. And even if the legislature
after framing an otherwise complete statute might allow
an administrative organ to decide whether or not that statute should be enforced, it would not necessarily follow that
the legislature might allow such an organ to decide upon
the terms of a statute, although unless that power were
grantable the legislature might not bestow upon an administrative organ any power over railroad rates further than
to apply regulations made by the legislature.
In view of the cases as to the contingent treatment of
foreign corporations, it seems that a state might make the
local railroad rates to depend upon the rates which the federal government might establish for interstate transportation, and, conversely, the federal govermnent might make
the interstate rates to depend upon the rates which the
states might establish for local transportation.88
This
can not be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." Observe the phraseology. But while the legislature unquestionably may
grant the power to use some discretion when executing a statute, yet,
except where legislative power may be delegated, valid objection certainly can be made to a grant of discretion as to whether or not a
statute shall be executed.
" See note 22, supra.
',
See Oberholtzer, The Referendum in America, 2o8-2I7; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., i68 et seq.; 6 A. & E. Enc. of L.,
2d ed., io22.

" This does not mean that a state legislature might in all cases
make local rates depend upon interstate rates established by the carriers, or, conversely, that Congress might in all cases make interstate rates depend upon local rates established by the carriers. The
commerce clause would at times affect such legislation. Louisville &
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would certainly be true if we could be sure that after such
a law was passed the basic rates would in every instance
be established simply with a view to their effect upon the
transportation subject to the sovereignty establishing them
and without regard to their effect upon rates not subject
to that sovereignty. And it is questionable whether, when
N. R. Co. v. Eubank, (i9o2) 184 U. S. 27, 22 Sup. Ct. 277, which arose
under that clause, decides that a state may not forbid a railroad to
charge more for carrying between two points within the state than-it
charges for a longer interstate haul which includes the shorter route,
when the prohibition would have a direct effect upon interstate commerce. The company was commanded to change the rate for either the
local or the interstate haul. In the case considered the earnings from
the local haul were more important. Therefore, rather than lower its
local rate, the company would have raised its interstate rate, although
on its so doing its competitors would have secured its interstate traffic.
It seems, however, that if the local earnings had been less important
than the interstate earnings the court should have held that the regulation did not violate the commerce clause, for in that case the company
would have retained its interstate, and lowered its local, rate, which
was probably the main result sought by the state. It seems also that if
a minimum interstate rate had been fixed by the federal government,
and, therefore, that rate could not have been reduced by the carrier,
the long and short haul provision should have been sustained, for it
would have affected only the changeable rate--that for the shorter,
and not for the interstate, haul. The court lends support to this position by referring to a hypothetical case in which local rates are fixed
by state statute and then saying, "Congress does not interfere with
local rates by adopting their sum as the interstate rate." These words,
of course, must be read in their proper connection, for if they referred
to local rates which are fixed by the carrier the dictum would be inconsistent with the decision in the case under consideration. If Congress were allowed to adopt as the interstate rate the sum of the
local rates established by the carrier it might in some cases directly affect local rates, according to the present decision, and Congress may
not interfere with local commerce to any greater extent than the states
may interfere with interstate commerce: the Tenth Amendment is fully
as much a part of the federal Constitution as is the eighth section of
Article I. It seems, therefore, that if Congress should declare that
through rates should be the sum of the local rates as fixed by the carriers the question whether the act could constitutionally be applied
should depend in each case on whether the local earnings or the interstate earnings were of more importance to the carrier. It is true that
the view of the case taken in this note does not thoroughly coincide
with that taken in portions of the opinion. Thus the court says, "The
vice of the provision lies in the regulation of the rates between points
wholly within the state, by the rates which obtain between points outside of and those which are within the state." But both earlier and
later in the opinion the decision is based on the effect of the regulation,
and the facts of the case do not warrant reference to it for the establishment of any other test of constitutionality.
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considering an alleged delegation of power, a court might
inquire into the motive underlying the establishment of the
basic rates.
It may be conceded that the federal statute which provides that, in cases where they apply, the laws of the several states shall be regarded by the federal courts as rules
of decision in trials at common law8 9 is hardly. in point,

for so far as substantive law is concerned Congress could
not constitutionally have provided otherwise.90 And hardly
analogous is the federal statute which provides that, in
common law causes, the circuit and district courts shall
enforce such remedies upon judgments as were, at the time
the statute was enacted, provided by the laws of the states
within which those courts are held and such remedies upon
judgments as were or may be subsequently provided by
state laws and adopted by general rules of those courts. 91
Nor is that statute analogous which provides that, in civil
causes other than equity and admiralty causes, those courts
shall follow as nearly as may be the procedure in the courts
of record of the states within which such circuit and district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding.9 2 The latter statute, which, if it were inter"Rev. Stats., sec. 721; 4 Fed. Stats. An. 517; Rose, Ctode of Federal
Procedure, sec. 12.
"See Patterson, The United States and the States Under the Constitution, 2d ed., sec. iog; Rose, Code of Federal Procedure, secs. 1o,
notes a, r, 799, note c. And those laws must also be so regarded in
trials in chancery.
91Rev. Stats., sec. 916; 4 Fed. Stats. An. 58o; Rose, Code of Federal
Procedure, sec. 925; Fink v. O'Neil, (1882) Io6 U. S. 272, I Sup. Ct.
325; Ex parte Boyd, (1882) io5 U. S. 647, 65I; Ross v. Duval, (1839)
13 Pet. 45; Wayman v. Southard, (825)
IO Wheat I; Bank of the
U. S. v. Halstead, (1825) IO Wheat. 5I. In spite of the decisions and
the language of Marshall, C. J., in Wayman v. Southard, io Wheat. at
49, 50, it does not seem clear that, in a case in which the jurisdiction is
based upon the diverse citizenship of the parties, a federal court may
constitutionally ignore a then-existing state law, for example, as to
stays of execution or exemptions from execution, if the state is not
seeking to thwart the federal remedy by allowing a spedial stay or
exemption to such defendant or defendants. See also Rev. Stats., sec.
915; 4 Fed. Stats. An. 577; Rose, Code of Federal Procedure, sec. 9o5.
"Rev. Stats., sec. 914; 4 Fed. Stats. An. 563; Rose, Code of Federal
Procedure, sec. oo.-Consider also 2 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 364.
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preted in accordance with its probable meaning, would allow the state authorities incidentally to change the procedure in federal courts, 93 might possibly be sustained upon the
ground upon which were sustained the less sweeping earlier
statutes which merely adopted the procedure then followed
by state courts and authorized the federal courts to alter
and add to such rules :94 the Supreme Court said that the
providing of such rules was not an act exclusively legislative in character and might be entrusted to .the courts concerned; 95 The statute under consideration, however, has
been so interpreted by the Supreme Court as to make it
unnecessary for federal courts to follow the procedure in
the courts of record of the states within which the federal
courts are held. 96
But while the determination of the principles upon which
rates shall be regulated is exclusively legislative in its character, and might not be entrusted by the state legislatures
to Congress or by Congress to the state legislatures, it seems
that a legislative body would not be delegating its power if
it provided that rates which were subject to it should be
affected as the merely incidental result of regulation by the
legislature of another sovereignty of rates which were subject to regulation by that other body.
"Not, however, of course, where the federal courts would thereby
be required to act contrary to the federal Constitution or a federal
statute: see Rose, Code of Federal Procedure, sec. goo, note f.
"Rose, Code of Federal Procedure, sec. goo, notes a, aa.
"Of course, it does not necessarily follow that, because the legislature may entrust a power to the organ concerned, the legislature may
entrust that power to a third authority. Still, so far at least as regards
cases in which federal courts acquire jurisdiction by reason of the
diverse citizenship of the parties, the statutes under consideration
obviously carry out the purpose for which jurisdiction was granted to
the federal courts far better than would any statutes which established
uniform rules of procedure and uniform remedies upon judgments
throughout the entire country.
" See Boston & M. R. v. Gokey, (9o8) 210 U. S. 155, 28 Sup. Ct.
657; case there cited; Rose, Code of Federal Procedure, sec. 805, beginning of note b, see. goo, note g. Rev. Stats., sec. 914, was taken from a
statute enacted much later than that from which Rev. Stats., sec. D18,
was taken, and the courts, in interpreting the Revised Statutes, ought
to give weight to that fact. See note at 4 Fed. Stats. An. 585, on the
operation of sec. 914.
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The courts have also at times sustained legislation which
granted discretion to administrative organs. Where the
discretion granted was not great7 the decisions are probably correct, for the legislature cannot be expected to determine every unimportant question which may arise. But
9
other decisions which sustain larger grants of discretion "
"See, e. g., State v. Wagener, (1899) 77 Minn. 483, 8o N. W. 633,
46 L. R. A. 442; In re Kollock, (1897) 165 U. S. 526, 17 Sup. Ct. 444;
language used in Wayman v. Southard, (1825) io Wheat. 1, 43, quoted
in note 67, supra; 1O Wheat. 45, 46; Jermyn v. Fowler, (1898) 186 Pa.
595, 4o Atl. 972, where one of the two inconsistent positions taken by
the court was that the board might be granted a discretion as to
matters of detail; and also St. Louis, L M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Neal,
(i9o6) Ark., 98 S. W. 958, 961; State v. Bryan, (igo5) 5o Fla. 293, 39
So. 929, 953; Woodruff v. New Y. & N. E. R. Co., (i8go) 59 Conn. 63,
84, 2o At. 17, ig; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, (igo8) 210
U. S. 281, 287, 26 Sup. Ct. 616, 617; In re Opinion of Justices, (Igo7)
N. H., 68 AtL 873. Compare Fite v. State, (i9o5) 114 Tenn. 646, 658,
659, 88 S. W. 941, 944, L. R. A. N. S. 520, 525; Central of Ga. Ry.
Co. v. Railroad Comn., (igo8) i61 Fed. 925, 985; other cases cited in
note 26, supra; and State v. Burdge, (1897) 95 Wis. 39o, 70 N. W. 347,
37 L R. A. 157.
"Brady v. Mattern, (19o4)

125 Iowa, i58, ioo N. W. 358. (The
court overlooks the insurance commissioner cases, cited in note 26,
supra, and it cites Ryan v. Outagamie County, (I89I) 8o Wis. 336, 5o
N. W. 340, although the reason given for the Wisconsin decision is
flatly in conflict with that on which the Iowa decision is based. The
opinion in the Iowa railroad commission case, which is one of the
two commission cases cited, does not mention the question of delegation of legislative power.) State v. Preferred T. M. Co., (1904) 184
Mo. i6o, 82 S. W. 1075. (The court says that in an earlier Missouri
case an act requiring a uniform policy of insurance, to be approved
by the Superintendent of Insurance, was held to be constitutional,
although in that case the court did not hold that the act was constitutional; it cites an insurance company case which has nothing to do with
the question; and it cites a case upholding the validity of an ordinance
which provided for the licensing of engineers.) The decisions in
Kingman et al., Petitioners, (1891) 153 Mass. 566, 27 N. E. 778, 12
L R. A. 417 (compare State v. Hudson Co. Ave. CoMrs., (1874) 37
N. J. L. 12, 19; the Mdssachusetts case was followed in later cases in
the same state, cited in L. R. A. Cases as Authorities); Martin v.
Witherspoon, (1882) 135 Mass. 175 (no authorities cited; compare
Board of Harbor Cornrs. v. Excelsior R. Co., (i89i) 88 Cal. 491, 26
Pac. 375) ; Ingram v. State, (1864) 39 Ala. 247 (no authorities cited) ;
In re Senate Bill, (1889) 12 Colo. i88, 21 Pac. 481 (where, however,
it does not appear that the general question of delegation of legislative
power was considered), are also unsound. The constitutionality of
the acts considered in Arnett v. State, (igo7) 168 Ind. i8o, 8o N. .
153, 8 L. R. A. N. S. 1192; State v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., (i9o7) Kan.,
92 Pac. 6o6; State v. Barringer, (1892) i1O N. C. 525, 14 S. E. 78r;
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can be supported only on the assumption that the legislature
may delegate legislative power upon important subjects
which it may specify; and in still other cases (among them
the oft-cited Ohio case in which the court sustained a statute allowing the people of the respective counties to decide
whether or not county bonds should be issued in aid of
railroad construction)"9 while the decisions are doubtless
sound the reasoning upon which those decisions are based
can be supported only upon the same assumption.
If, where an administrative organ received large grants
of discretion, it adopted principles sufficient to afford it cornPeople v. Dunn, (1889)

80 Cal. 211, 22 Pac. 140, is not clear. Compare
Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comn., (19o8) 161 Fed. 925, 985,
where the court declared unconstitutional a state law in which an
attempt was made to confer upon a commission a large amount of
discretion as to rates.
"See note 85, supra. The decision in Picton v. Cass County, (i9o4)
13 N. D. 242, oo N. W. 711, is sound, but the reason given for it is
not, unless the fact that the resources of the state were involved constitutes an exceptional circumstance. The same reason had been
improperly given in a number of cases cited in that opinion. In State
v. Hagood, (I888) 30 S. C. 519, 9 S. E. 686, 3 L. R. A. 841, where a
statute provided that licenses to mine within the public domain might
be granted or refused by the Board of Agriculture according to its
judgment as to the best interests of the state, the court refused the
petition of a mining company for a mandamus compelling the board to
grant a license; and in United States v. Williams, (1887) 6 Mont. 379,
12 Pac. 85i, where an act of Congress provided that timber growing
on the public lands might be cut subject to such regulations as the
Secretary of the Interior might prescribe for the protection of the
undergrowth "and for other purposes," the court sustained an action
for the value of timber cut in violation of law. In each case the court
said that legislative power was not delegated to administrative officers.
It seems that that reason was unsound, and that the courts should,
instead, have said merely that the absence of valid statutes did not
warrant the appropriation of public property by individuals.-In several
cases, e. g., People v. Grand T. W. Ry. Co., (1908) 232 Il. 292, 298, 83
N. E. 839, 842; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, (1894) i49 Ill. 361,
378, 37 N. . 247, 25r, 24 -L.R. A. 141, 145; and see cases there cited
and Wayman v. Southard, (1825) ioWheat. 1, 43; the courts have said
that a legislature "may authorize others to do those things which it
might properly, yet cannot understandingly or advantageously, do
itself." Undoubtedly a legislature may delegate to others some powers
which it might rightfully exercise itself. But the statement, which is
worthless as a test of constitutionality, cannot properly mean that
where a legislature cannot advantageously enact specific regulations it
may empower others to make such regulations without the guidance of
legislatively-established principles.
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plete guidance and announced those principles as publicly
and as formally as laws are announced, it would be clear to
most persons that that organ was exercising power which
is strictly legislative. And where the reasons for administrative decisions are not announced in advance or where
that organ does not decide in advance upon any guiding
principles whatever its determinations are fully as legislative in their nature. 10 0 The fact that no act legislative in
character preceded its determinations in- specific cases cannot make those determinations valid. The legislature alone
has power to change the requirements of the government
as to the conduct of individuals; and while the legislature,
though it may state its requirements in specific form, need
not do so, but may entrust that power to an administrative
organ if the legislature itself ordains the principles from
which those specific rules may be deduced, an administrative organ would exercise legislative power if it enforced
rules which were not based upon principles established by
the legislature or if it interfered with the conduct of individuals without the previous establishment of any rule
whatever.
Of course, if there were only one degree and character
of rate regulation which a legislature might constitutionally
ordain, it would be sufficient for the legislature simply to
create a commission and empower it to name specific rates.
Further directions would be unnecessary. But it is obvious that there are constitutionally possible regulations of
"'Of course where no uniform rules are adopted the danger of
injustice is far greater than where they are adopted. The adminis.trative organ may act not merely at haphazard, but with partiality, and
the opportunity to work great injustice through partiality gives to
persons who may be unscrupulous a means of keeping themselves in
misused power. The danger is a real one. It would be far easier for
that organ to act with dishonest motives than it would be to prove such
motives so clearly as to warrant a court in restraining the action upon
that ground. And if the opportunity to work such injustice might
constitutionally be given to an administrative organ, no assumption by
the judiciary of an unrestrained veto power-which is not granted to
the judiciary by the constitutions-would be sufficient to prevent such
an evil.
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rates which differ in extent and character. The legislature
may seek merely to prevent manifestly extortionate or manifestly discriminatory charges; or it may, within broad constitutional limits, go further and, disregarding the question
whether the rates and the relations between rates which
have been fixed by the carriers are manifestly improper in
themselves, it may command that the rates and the relations between rates be made to conform to principles of
public policy laid down by the legislature. 0°1
And, of
course, in deciding upon the policy to be followed and in
settling the claims of conflicting interests, there are abundant opportunities for differences of opinion and there are
at least several possible solutions of the questions at issue.
'"As Mr. Victor Morawetz said before the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce on April 18, i9o5, "The expressions 'reasonable
rates' and 'unreasonable rates' are often used in very different senses.
Thus, when it is said that a rate shall be reasonable, this may mean (i)
that the rate shall not be unreasonably high and illegal under the
common law and the interstate commerce act, or (2) that the rate shall
not be unreasonably low in the sense of being confiscatory, or (3)
that the rate shall be the particular rate which, in the opinion of a
commission or of some particular person, ought to be established
between these two extremes." "There is a wide range between a rate
that is unreasonably high, and therefore illegal as against the shipper,
and a rate that is so low as to be confiscatory as against the carrier.
For example: assuming that a railway company may charge 40 cents a
hundred pounds for carrying a given article between two points without
making the rate unreasonably high and therefore illegal, it is quite
possible that this rate might be reduced by legislative action to, say, 30
cents a hundred pounds without violating any constitutional right of
the carrier. In this case the maximum rate which would be reasonable
and which could be imposed by the carrier upon the shipper would be
40 cents a hundred pounds, and the minimum rate which could be
imposed by the legislature on the railway company would be 30 cents a
hun'dred pounds." As the legislature may prohibit rates which are
extortionate and may prescribe rates which are not confiscatory, there
is no reason whatever to doubt that the legislature may itself fix rates
anywhere between those extremes, and that it may authorize a commission to fix rates at any'point between those extremes if the legislature declares what that point shall be.-The opinion in Trustees v.
Saratoga G., E. L. & P. Ca., (i9o8) I9i N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693, 700,
does not call for serious consideration. The court apparently overlooked the fact that a legislature may itself name specific rates, and
did not realize that the word "reasonable" is used in more than one
sense. And in Interstate C. S. Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, (I9o7) 207
U. S. 79, 86, 28 Sup. Ct. 26, 27, Holmes, J., apparently did not give
sufficient consideration to the use of the word "reasonable." On that
point he spoke only for himself.
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For the problems involved in rate regulation are complicated and important. A legislature, in deciding upon principles of regulation, may affect economic conditions within
the territory subject to it at least as greatly as they could
10 2
be affected by any possible changes in the federal tariff.
Since, therefore, there is a wide range of possible differences in the extent and character of regulations, it necessarily follows that, unless legislative power may be dlegated, when the legislature entrusts to .a commission the
power of naming specific rates, it must state definitely what
principles. are to be made effective by that commission.
Some of the courts which have sustained statutes authorizing commissions to name railroad rates have thought,
more or less clearly, that in those statutes the legislatures
had declared what the law should be and had left to the
commissions merely the enforcement of legislation. We
'For example, a change in the relation between the rates charged
on carload lots and those charged on less than carload lots may cause
the building up of a jobbing business or may cause the following of
different methods of distribution; a change in the relation between
raw and manufactured products, as between grain and flour or live
stock and dressed meat, may cause a shifting in the location of a
manufacturing industry; a change in the relation between products
which can at times be substituted for each other, as between the various
kinds of building materials or the various kinds of food stuffs, may
seriously affect the producers; and a change in the relation between
different termini may cause the decay of one community and the
upbuilding of another. A change of rate upon one road may be
important mainly because of the change in relation to rates charged
by another road which carries products from a competing source of
supplies or to a competing market in a different part of the country.
Of course, where the rates imposed by the government are merely
maximum and not absolute the carrier may be able to allow the relation
between the rates actually charged to remain the same. But any
change in the relation between rates does affect economic conditions
and may affect them seriously.-And even when no question of the
relation between rates is involved, a change in rates may have a serious
effect upon the producers as well as upon the railroad and upon the
consumers. Passing over the more obvious illustrations-a reduction
in the rates chargeable may make it necessary for the carrier to reduce
its operating expenses, delaying transportation in each case until there
accumulates an amount of freight nearer to the maximum hauling
capacity of its engines, in that way giving to the large producer or the
producer at a large shipping centre an advantage over a competitor
who produces less or who is less favorably situated.
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have gathered together the cases in which the courts took
that position and have shown the provisions of the statutes there involved. 10 3 But none of those courts realized
that important differences in rate regulation are constitutionally possible. Consequently, of course, none of those
courts sufficiently considered the question whether in the
statute before it the legislature had actually established definite principles for the guidance of the commission in naming specific rates. And for that reason it cannot be said
that that question has been finally settled as to any particular statutory provision.
It is possible, in view of the context in some of the statutes, that the term, "reasonable rates" is used to denote rates
which mark the border beyond which charges by the carrier would be extortionate, and while there may be some
doubt as to just what would constitute an extortionate
charge, it seems that a grant of power to name such rates
would not be so indefinite as to be unconstitutional. But
the statutes do not appear to use the word "reasonable" in
any other sense which is so definite that, if interpreted in
that way, a grant of power to name "reasonable rates"
would be constitutional. It is true that some courts have,
by way of false analogy, applied the term "reasonable" to
rates which were not so low as to be confiscatory; yet we
cannot say that the statutes in empowering the naming of
"reasonable rates" intended to direct that the rates should
be made as low as would be constitutional. And no one
who is acquainted with railroad transportation would assert
that, on principle, between the extremes of extortion and
confiscation there can be only one rate which is justifi10 4
able.
While, however, a grant of the power to name "reason"'See note 33, supra.

"As Mr. Victor Morawetz said before the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce on April i8, i9o5, "It is rarely, if ever, true that
there is but one just and reasonable rate for the transportation of a
given article between two points. In nearly every instance there is a
wide range within which any rate would be just and reasonable."
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able rates" is constitutional if that term is used by the legislature to enunciate a definite principle in accordance with
which the commission must act, yet when that term is inextricably bound up with other terms which are indefinite the
entire clause seems to be unconstitutional. This is true in
the case of the Interstate Commerce Act. And we have
there not only the language of the statute itself but also
the interpretation which the commission has placed upon
such language to show that Congress has attempted to confer
upon the commission a discretion which is so broad that
the provision cannot be upheld upon any ground which is
not flatly inconsistent with the rule that legislative power
may not be delegated.
We have, for instance, the statement of the commission
.itself that "every case before the commission, however
trivial it may appear, involves in its disposition the formulation of principles under the law which have important
bearing upon the business of carriers and the commerce,
not only of the immediate locality, but often of the entire
country." 105 And while Congress may not have realized
'0 Sixth Annual Report, (1892) p. 12. This statement was repeated
in its Seventh Annual Report, (1893) p. 13, the commission also saying
that "what may sometimes appear to be unnecessary delay in the disposition of matters before the commission is really the taking of time to
consider the effect of a ruling uion the whole situation and beyond
that which might be just as between only the parties to the record."
And in iti Ninth Annual Report, (895) p. 59. the commission said,
"To some extent the principles upon which taxation rests must be
allowed in fixing a just rate; to some extent the result of the rate
upon the development of industries must be taken into the account in
all decisions which the commission is called upon to make; to some
extent every question of transportation involves mofal and social considerations, so that a just rate cannot be determined independently of
the theory of social progress." See also Fourth Annual Report, (i89o)
p. 6; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com. Cornn., (I896) 162 U. S.
197, 234, I6 Sup. Ct. 666, 681. Commissioner Prouty said in the American Monthly Review of Reviews for May, i9o6, p. 595, "Now the fixing
of a railway rate is in its nature legislative rather than judicial. There
is no standard by which it can be determined.

.

.

. In determining

the justice or reasonableness of a particular rate all these factors, and
many others, may present themselves -for consideration. They are
properly taken into account by the traffic official who fixes the rate in
.the first -instance, and they must be considered by the administrative
body-wbich revises that rate. It is finally a question of judgment what,
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the indefiniteness of its grant of power, it is true that a
consistent application of the law involves the formulation of
important principles which may affect fourteen billion
dollars' worth of railroad property; which may affect one
and a half million workmen and their families who are
directly dependent upon railroad earnings; and which may
affect seriously every industry and every section of the country. And it involves the formulation of those principles by
an administrative body and not by Congress.
Of course, the executive department seeks such grants
of power. A President who suspended the enforcement of
important laws, and who even turned into a forest reserve
millions of acres of land which Congress had expressly
directed him to throw open to public settlement, 10 6 does not
hesitate to ask for broad grants of discretion. The power
which he secured for the Interstate Commerce Commission
is no greater than that which he tried to secure for his
Commissioner of Corporations, a power which in the hands
of an aggressive person might prove very useful during
political campaigns-especially in the absence of a law
requiring the publication of the receipts of campaign committees-and perhaps at other times. And that power might
constitutionally be granted to the Commissioner of Corpo-

taking everything into account, ought fairly to be done." In the same
article he declared, p. 596, "It exercises precisely the same administrative function in correcting as does the traffic official in establishing" rates, with the qualification that the commission considers more
than the interests of the carrier. In connection with that declaration
should be read his statement in the same magazine for July, i9o6, p. 65,
"The making of a railway rate rests in the judgment of the traffic
official. Within very wide limits that official could not demonstrate by
any legal standard and legal evidence that his rate was right; neither
could the shipper demonstrate by the same methods that it was wrong."
'Other illustrations of executive usurpation are given in Pierce,
Federal Usurpation, p. 107 et seq. And see also pages i9o, 280, :28r,
283, 304, 355, of that book. It is said that the President also established
an extensive code of laws for the Canal Zone without authority from
Congress: see Congressional Record for May 26, 19o8, p. 729o. And
the recent unauthorized issue of bonds by his Secretary of the Treasury
is well known.
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rations if the grant of power to the Interstate Commerce
Commission is constitutional.
Indeed, if the legislature may constitutionally grant a
broad discretion to a railroad commission, where must it
stop? May not Congress delegate to a commission similar
power over the tariff or over taxation in general? May
not the state legislatures delegate to commissions similar
power over the criminal laws? May not the power which
is granted to seven men or five or three-be granted to one
man,10 7 and not upon one subject only, but upon every
subject which now comes before the legislatures ?1o8
Robert P. Reeder.
'"Indeed, the President can now control the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, for its members are removable at his
pleasure: see section ii of the Act.
'UAs was said by Mr. E. B. Whitney in 31 Am. L. Reg. x86, "Many
cases could be put in which the ruling party could, for a considerable
time, perpetuate its power in a situation like that of the second session
of the Fifty-first Congress. President, Senate and House of Representatives then belonged to the same political party, and had it in their
power to make the laws. They knew that on the fourth day of March
then next ensuing the opposition would obtain control of one branch
of Congress, so that for two years party legislation would be impossible.
If a Congress has an unlimited right of delegation, a series of acts
could easily, and might in the future, perhaps, not improbably, be
passed, which should secure to the President the right of legislation
during those two years, while the ensuing Congress would simply and
easily, by the ordinary parliamentary processes, be stifled in a deadlock.
Thus the power to delegate involves the power to create a limited
dictatorship."

